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In a marketplace society, we believe we confront each other as human beings. The 
following argument will demonstrate this assumption to be incorrect. To 
understand why the person and the human are not coextensive terms, we must 
demonstrate their mutually contradictory relationship in market society and the 
estrangement of the latter by the former. 
What is a person, then, if not a human being? In demonstrating this 
distinction, we will show how the constitution of the person stands in 
contradiction to our social and collective nature as human beings. This 
contradiction is already an expression of there being no essential basis for being 
human in personhood itself. From the legal standpoint, not all humans are persons 
and not all persons are human. Only on the basis that being a human is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for being a person is our market behaviour as persons 
inessential and contrary to our existence as humans. The exclusion of some 
humans from personhood, and hence their loss of rights, equality, freedom, and 
hence dehumanization, is the net result of this contradiction.   
 Following a definition of the human being, this thesis offers a critique of 
three social categories of thought and behaviour constitutive of personhood for 
market society: the legal, the egoistic, and the moral. It will be shown that these 
categories are reflections of various aspects of market relations alone and not 
human relations. The argument tackles yet another problem at the core of 
personhood: the historical appearance of these constitutive moments of 
personhood, and hence private property ownership, are taken to be the 
transhistorical essence of the human being. It is in this confusion between 
appearance and essence that our existence as persons becomes an ideological 
existence.  The novel approach to the problem of the person presented here, is to 
demonstrate that the person and the human are two social existences that stand in 
contradiction with one another.  
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Thesis Statement and Literature Review 
 
Thesis Statement and Outline 
This thesis approaches the problem of personhood from the point of view of the 
distinction of the person and the human being. This is not a technical distinction 
but a real social distinction that is lived in market society. A necessary part of 
addressing this distinction attempts to understand why this distinction is not 
immediately accessible to perception, let alone understanding. The novel approach 
to the problem of personhood offered in this thesis attempts to understand this 
distinction between the person and the human as a social contradiction: because 
we are alienated we become persons and because we are persons in the 
satisfaction of all our social needs we take personhood to be what it means to be 
human. In market society, the person and the human form a contradictory unity.  
 This research investigates the reality behind this contradiction and seeks to 
understand how market society produces the social form we call the person. This 
entails historical analyses, evaluation of philosophical characteristics of 
personhood, and an understanding of the political economic forces that constitute 
personhood as a social relation. As the social formation in question is market 
society, this includes commodity production and exchange in both capitalist and 
pre-capitalist market formations where the category of the person appears. We 
will demonstrate how the conceptual aspects of the person – legal, egoistic, and 
moral – are reflections of various levels of development in market society and 
various logics of the market relation.  
 The category of the person is researched in many different ways – all of 
which focus on the category as it pertains to a specific realm of estranged human 
life in market society. Topical issues surrounding personhood concern 
racialization, gender, sexuality, age, physical ability, or intellectual ability, to 
name a few. These areas specifically concern the relationship between personhood 
and particular groups of humans. This relation between the person and the human 
is taken up in this thesis in a fundamental way.  
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 Other realms of inquiry that take up the question of personhood with 
respect to nonhuman beings will not be discussed. This includes the potential 
personhood for animals, ecosystems, robots, corporations, or divinities. But the 
fact that personhood may be extended to nonhuman animals makes our distinction 
between the person and the human immediately tenable. Being a human is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to be a person. If this is the case, the very basis on which 
it is possible to grant nonhuman beings personhood is also the basis upon which it 
is possible to exclude humans from personhood.    
 The real puzzlement comes when we point out the fact that some humans 
are excluded from personhood even though we continue to define what it means to 
be human with the premises of the person.  Documents like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights speak about the human being as though the 
premises of the person are the foundation of what it means to be human. But other 
documents like the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities are hesitant to recognize the humans in question with the full rights of 
persons.   
 The premise of the person we are referring to is the rational substrate of 
private property. What this means is that we ideologically take the status of private 
property ownership to be the rational substrate of the human being. But if humans 
considered intellectually disabled are unable to assert themselves with the full 
status of private property ownership, are they not considered human beings? If the 
category of the person is distinct from and in contradiction with the human, as this 
thesis argues, how is it possible that the exclusion from personhood also means 
forsaking recognition as human? This is the strange puzzle of personhood.   
  If we consider the historical and social form of the person that belongs to 
market society, the pieces of the puzzle begin to fall into place. Let us recall what 
Marx writes about bourgeois political economic categories in Capital: 
 
Political economy has indeed analyzed the value and its magnitude, however 
incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But 
it has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that 
particular form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the 
measurement of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the 
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value of the product. These formulas, which bear the stamp of belonging to a 
social formation in which the process of production has mastery over man, 
instead of the opposite, appear to political economists’ bourgeois consciousness 
to be as much a self-evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour 
itself.1  
 
The argument follows from the position that the person is a historical 
category of thought belonging to a specific social formation. By a socially valid 
category, furthermore, we are also referring to the person as a social existence that 
is produced in market society and constitutes the movement of relations of private 
property.  
Chapter One provides a methodological point of view for understanding 
the distinction and contradiction between the person and the human being. It 
places the social existence of persons and the human being in the dialectic of 
appearance and essence, respectively. Initial definitions of the person and the 
human are offered in manner maintained throughout the thesis’ argument. What is 
presented here in the methodology and the definitions is the basic framework 
through which the rest of our analyses follows. 
Following sections in Chapter One analyze the nature of personification, 
that is, the transformation of the human into the person. In order to demonstrate 
that the person’s social existence belongs to market society, we demonstrate the 
way humans transform into personifications of economic relations through their 
position in commodity production and exchange. As a precursor to Chapter Two, 
a final section shows how the juridical relation between persons in market society 
is derived directly from the process of personification. It is quickly shown that the 
person appears at the point from which the concrete and historical character of the 
human being is abstracted 
Chapter Two addresses four aspects of personhood relevant for market 
society in general and specifically to capitalist market society. Three of these 
aspects concern the primary relations between person necessary for the production 
 





and exchange of private property. These are the legal, egoistic, and moral relation 
found in the sphere of personhood. A fourth aspect concerns perspective and seeks 
to understand how the person is taken as if it were a human being. We argue here 
that the legal, egoistic, and moral characteristics of personhood is furnished by the 
immediate perception that takes these premises to be the natural state of the 
human being. 
The subsections in chapter two are as follows. Section 2.1 focuses on the 
emergence of the legal category of the person in Roman civil law. Here, the 
person emerges as a category of private property ownership. Section 2.2 
investigates the category of the person according to Stoic natural law, which 
asserts the premises of private ownership to be naturally instantiated in the human 
being.  
Analyses in sections 2.3 and 2.4 investigates the category of the person 
constituted by egoistic relations and moral relations. We are not concerned with 
philosophical views inasmuch as we are concerned with the political economic 
forces that give rise to egoistic and moral social activity, which in turn gives rise 
to egoistic and moral philosophy as an afterthought.  
What is demonstrated in sections 2.1 through 2.4 are various sides of the 
relations between persons that come together to form the basic foundations of 
market relations. Neither of these aspects of the person are reducible to one 
another but together form a contradictory unity reflecting the contradictory social 
relations in market society. What is also demonstrated throughout these sections is 
how the constitution of the person through these kinds of market relations always 
involves a moment of negation of the human being, where the social reality of the 
human is lost at the moment of legal formalization, moral abstraction, and egoistic 
atomization. These negative moments constitute the dual reality of market society 
where the social existence of the person comes into contradiction with the human 
being who finds him or herself estranged in the process.  
Chapter 3 completes the analysis of the estrangement of the human 
community within market society. Here we link the social existence of the person 
to the alienation of the human in commodity production and exchange. Only by 
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demonstrating how the social existence of the person comes into contradiction 
with the human being as the alienated existence of the human being are we 
capable of understanding how the person/non-person dichotomy comes to 
configure the fundamental social parameters of market society. A following 
section considers how the non-person is also a social existence produced just like 
the person and that both sides of this relation are necessary aspects of production 
and exchange in market society. In this section we will discuss the case of 
racialization as a socially produces existence of the non-person whose pretensions 
are carried over after the acquisition of personhood.   
 A concluding chapter considers the far-reaching implications of this 
analysis of personhood for scholarship. We emphasize here that wherever it is 
sought to understand the estrangement of humans in general or certain groups in 
particular the basic problem of a dual and contradictory social existence between 
persons/non-persons and estranged humans must play a central role in uncovering 
the reality of market society hidden in plain sight.  
 
Literature Review and Topical Issues 
The following literature review covers concepts and issues of personhood that are 
thematically relevant to the argument of the thesis. Under the headings Etymology, 
The orthodox view, and Legal positivism and natural law theory are concepts of 
the person belonging to current scholarship concerning the themes of this thesis. 
Under the headings Exclusion from person some topical issues are addressed. 
 
Etymology  
The etymological origins of the category of the person is the Latin persona, whose 
own etymological origin is either Etruscan or Greek. The Etruscan phersu was 
theatrically dedicated, referring to the mask we wear before the publicum that 
hides our inner most private selves while enabling us to participate in public life.2 
 
2 Yasco Horsman and Frans-Willem Korsten. “Introduction: Legal Bodies: 
Corpus/Persona/Communitas.” Law & Literature: Special Issue: Legal Bodies: 
Corpus/Persona/Communitas 28, no. 3 (2016): 277 
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Another candidate is the Greek word prosopon of identical meaning.3 The 
Romans adopted the equivalent Latin word persona into legal genre as an allusion 
to the mask or a role that is played as the bearer of rights and duties. It was 
primarily not what a human being is, but a status-role that was ‘held’ or 
‘assumed’, hence the term persona commonly appearing as the direct object of 
similar classical Latin verbs.4  
To extend this metaphor further, the symbolic significance of persona as a 
mask is more than a mere face covering. It has to do with the voice of the human 
being beneath concealed by the mask. Hannah Arendt remarks, “The distinction 
between a private individual in Rome and a Roman citizen was that the latter had 
a persona, a legal personality, as we would say it; it was as though the law had 
affixed to him the part he was expected to play on the public scene, with the 
provision, however, that his own voice would be able to sound through.”5  
 
The orthodox view 
The category of the person in Western thought requires a very brief historical 
overview provided by Visa A.J. Kurki. It is first traced as far back as Roman law. 
Kurki emphasizes the importance of this origin as the formal basis of the Western 
legal tradition.6 According to Kurki, the oldest extant codified references to the 
category of the person are found in the Institutes, written by the Roman jurist, 
Gaius, around 160 CE. Concerning persons [personae] are also things [res] and 
the actions [actiones] of the former upon the latter. Kurki argues that this original 
codified relationship between persons and things (through actions) constitutes the 
“deep structure” of law constituting the core of all Western jurisdictions.7 But 
Gaius does not specify the content of that which falls under either of these two 
 
3 Visa A. J. Kurki, A Theory of Legal Personhood. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 31 
4 Long, A. A. “Stoic Philosophers on Persons, Property-Ownership, and Community” 335–360, in 
From Epicurus to Epictetus: Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy. (Oxford University 
Press.) 2006. 335 
5 From Arendt’s On Revolution, quoted in Jeanne Gaakeer. “"Sua Cuique Persona?" A Note on the 
Fiction of Legal Personhood and a Reflection on Interdisciplinary Consequences.” Law & 
Literature: Special Issue: Legal Bodies: Corpus/Persona/Communitas 28 no. 3 (2016): 288 
6 Kurki, Theory of Legal Personhood, 31 
7 ibid. 3 
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categories. What Gaius stipulates only is a formal taxonomy, a way of thinking 
about entities through a legal framework. There are but two entities: persons and 
things, and the field of rights, duties, and liberties structure the person’s possible 
actions with regards to these things. Res may technically refer to mere ‘things’, 
but this taxonomy arises with the specific priority in denoting the private form of 
property relations towards things. These two legal entities, persons and things (or 
property), are jointly exhaustive categories under which any being can be 
subsumed under law.8 Any action or being outside of this dichotomy is unknown 
to law. The question of whether or not a being falls under ‘person’ or ‘thing’ is a 
matter of content and not matter of the formal taxonomy itself, which is given as 
an a priori.  
According to Kurki, the formal features of legal personhood today are 
derivative of Gaius’ taxonomy. This view of the category of the person has 
become the Orthodox view of the person, according to which legal personhood 
involves “either the holding of rights and bearing of duties or the ‘legal capacity’ 
to hold rights and duties.”9 How this ‘capacity’ is determined is as old as Roman 
law itself. It is this notion of capacity that ultimately determines de jure whether 
or not a human being remains a mere ‘natural person’, or a full legal person with 
rights and duties. 
According to H. F. Jolowicz, the beginning of ‘natural personality’ in 
Rome is acquired as soon as the child is born and must live at least one moment 
post-partum. Only some human male citizens were candidates for full personhood. 
An unborn or stillborn child is not a natural person. As the capacity for 
personhood begins with birth, the human must remain alive, after which their 
legal personality will cease to exist upon death.  But it is ultimately the rational 
capacity to appreciate right and wrong that determines the full status of legal 
personhood in Rome.10  
 
8 ibid. 4 
9 ibid. 4 




According to Kurki, the paradigmatic natural person in the West today is 
derived from Roman law in a similar way. There are four basic qualities to natural 
personhood today: a natural person must 1) be a human being, 2) have been born, 
3) be currently alive, and 4) is sentient. These general criteria are found across all 
jurisdictions and are often challenged on the basis of those cases involving 
abortion, post mortem rights, anencephalic infants, and humans in a comatose or 
vegetative state, etc.11 Nevertheless, if all four criteria are sufficiently met, 
‘natural personhood’ is a certainty.  For the human being, this is necessary to 
become a paradigmatic ‘legal person’ but not sufficient to be one fully. A human 
who meets these criteria must also have sufficient rationality, or ‘legal capacity’, 
which is presumed when a human reaches the age of majority.  Full legal 
personhood, therefore, is contingent on a human’s mental ‘abilities’.12 The fifth 
criterion is the object of dispute for those advocating for the rights of children, 
seniors, intellectually disabled, women, and racialized persons who have been or 
continue to be scrutinized for their ‘mental capacities’. Formally speaking, if a 
natural person meets only the first four criteria, their status as a person may be 
considered ‘passive’ and not fully ‘active’ with respect to the fifth criterion.13 
A critical point must be made about personhood pertaining to this 
Orthodox view. What is implied here are rights, duties, and capacity relative to 
private property ownership. This scholarly and legal controversy around 
‘capacity’ is where the formal relationship between the person and private 
property slides into the background and is taken for granted. The focus on ‘rights 
and duties’ prioritize the content of the being that may be subsumed under the 
category of the person. The person’s abstract formal constitution through private 
property [res] remains a given. But the fact that this Orthodox view has 




11 Kurki, Theory of Legal Personhood, 7 
12 ibid. 9 
13 ibid. 9 
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Legal positivism and natural law theory 
Two historic traditions of legal theory in the modern period are legal positivism 
and natural law theory. These positions are worth mentioning here as they 
comprise the signification, philosophical, theoretical, methodological, and judicial 
exercise of law in the Western world. The person according to each theory is 
distinguished by its place in relation to the law and relationship to the material 
world. The following is a basic summary of their mutually oppositional positions.  
The person of natural law theory is traced as far back as the Roman Stoa, 
who were influential in Roman legal thought. The person of the modern form of 
natural law theory stems directly from the scholastics, notably St. Thomas of 
Aquinas, and has since enjoyed a secular rendition in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states “all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”14 The basic idea has not changed since 535 CE, when 
Justinian wrote “for by the law of nature, all men from the beginning were born 
free.”15 Generally speaking, natural law theory claims to offer a ‘human-centred’ 
approach to law, which tends to treat the person and the human as synonymous. 
Since Roman natural law, humans are taken to be the proper point - or the ‘final 
cause’ - of law and not mere ‘subjects’ of law. Law, writes John Finnis, “fit to take 
a directive place in practical reasoning towards morally sound judgement, is for 
the sake of human persons.”16 Finnis goes on to claim that the purpose of natural 
law is “to affirm the juridical significance of the status of persons—substances of 
a rational nature—as inherently the bearers (subjects) of rights of a kind different 
and more respect-worthy and end-like than the rights which are often, as a matter 
of technical means, attributed by law to animals, idols, ships or other objects of 
legal proceedings.”17 Natural law theory, for instance, is the conceptual basis upon 
which the personhood of a fetus is asserted.  
 
14 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III) 
15 Justinian. The Institutes of Justinian, 2009. Retrieved July 2020, from 
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5983/5983-h/5983-h.htm 
16 John Finnis, "Natural Law Theories", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. edited by 
Edward N. Zalta. 2020. §2 
17 ibid. §2 
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Personhood according to legal positivism belongs to the legal thought of 
industrialized society, the first full elaboration of which is found in Jeremy 
Bentham who sought to ‘demystify’ the law. What this means with regard to 
personhood is best represented by cornerstone legal positivist Hans Kelsen, who 
argued that “the juristic person who ‘has’ obligations and rights as their holder, is 
this obligations and rights - a complex of legal obligations and rights whose 
totality is expressed figuratively in the concept of “person”. “Person” is merely a 
personification of this totality”.18 Insofar as the person is a right that refers to 
other rights, claims Kelsen, it is a meaningless and empty tautology. It follows 
from this point of view that the person is an abstract dematerialization, what 
positivist H.L.A. Hart would call a historically contingent social construction of a 
given legal custom. What is banished from personhood in the positivist view is a 
‘final cause’.  
An important aspect of personhood according to legal positivism is also 
the methodologically descriptive role it plays in judicial reasoning. Finnis argues 
that Kelsen’s refusal to properly substantialize the person within the latter’s legal 
theory is what theoretically permits the judicial decision in Roe vs. Wade.19 In 
other words, the person is a question of ‘policy’ for legal positivism. Unlike 
natural law theory, which locates the human person as the final cause of law, there 
is no human being for positivism.  
 
Contemporary cases of humans excluded from personhood 
The following addresses issues on the personhood of intellectually disabled 
persons and children. The purpose in presenting these controversies is to highlight 
the mainstream emphasis on the notion of ‘legal capacity’ and its relationship to 
the principle of private property ownership. What is revealed about personhood in 
the cases of those without full rights is precisely this overarching principle of 
capitalist society. The significance of such a principle often goes unnoticed or is 
 
 18 Kelsen, H. Pure Theory of law. (Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange. 2009), 173 
19 Finnis, John. 2013. “The Priority of Persons Revisited” in The American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 58 no. 1 (2013): 46 
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taken for granted when the status of a person is not in question. Thus, a crisis in 
humans’ personhood goes a long way to reveal the truth about the true meaning of 
personhood. The system reveals itself in who it rejects by how it rejects. 
Persons with disabilities, and especially intellectual disabilities, are 
rejected from the full rights of legal personhood by virtue of their lacking “legal 
capacity”.20 This limitation often accompanies stigma, discrimination, and 
inhumane treatment in the forms of physical and psychological abuse. In the case 
of persons with intellectual disabilities, advocates argue that these realities faced 
by such humans are a direct result of their not being officially recognized as 
having legal capacity to assert rights as full persons.  
Persons with intellectual disabilities and their advocates claim that current 
models for determining legal capacity are rooted in atomized medical and 
psychological models of ‘testing’ mental ability and rationality. What is suggested 
as an alternative are holistic and social approaches towards recognizing the 
rational capacity that persons with intellectual disabilities do in fact have. The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities21 (CRPD) 
was adopted in 2006 with the intention of recalibrating the framework by which 
these humans were recognized as persons, which has since seen a slow but sure 
shift in the concept of legal capacity. Different models determining legal capacity 
revolve around the ability to give and appreciate consent. The traditional 
‘substitute decision-making’ model does not require consent from the ward but 
only from a guardian. The intellectually disabled person is here assumed to be 
without decision making capacity because certain cognitive abilities do not pass 
standardized cognitive tests inherent with the bias that such disabilities are to be 
‘cured’. Advocates of the newer ‘supportive decision-making model’ argue to the 
contrary, asserting that we must attempt “to discern the person’s intentions in 
various ways. Close family members, for example, can often communicate with 
an individual in a way that others cannot due to their alertness to more subtle cues 
 
20 Nicholas Caivano, “Conceptualizing Capacity: Interpreting Canada's Qualified Ratification of 
Article 12 of the UN Disability Rights Convention.” 4:1 online: UWO J Leg Stud. 3 (2014) 
21 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities : resolution / 
adopted by the General Assembly, 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106 
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and their experience with that person. If communications are indeterminate, the 
system requires following the person’s previously expressed wishes, abiding 
values and experience in similar situations.”22  
Reinterpreting the meaning of legal capacity for persons with intellectual 
disability makes an interesting point about the meaning of legal capacity for all 
legal persons in general. But the ultimate constitution of personhood does not 
change in this newer model. Article 3 of the CRPD affirms the views of these 
advocates by relocating the constitution of legal capacity to the outside world and 
not the atomized mind of the human: “States Parties shall take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may 
require in exercising their legal capacity.” But an important dimension to this is 
the relationship to private property outlined in Article 15: “States Parties shall take 
all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of persons with 
disabilities to own or inherit property… and shall ensure that persons with 
disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.”23 
We are reminded of the child’s exclusion from the universality of 
personhood because the universality of human rights do not extend to the child.  
As Gary Teeple argues,  
 
All human rights extend only to those who are defined as “persons” in law in a 
capitalist society; and a “person” is defined as someone over the age of 
majority, as a rational, autonomous possessor of private property rights, if only 
over one’s own labour power. Children are not persons in this sense; their 
principle legal status consists of being possessions of their parents or guardians 
or wards of the state until the age of majority.24  
 
Worthiness for personhood, with respect to the child, is predicated on what 
the child is meant to become – not as an adult, but as an autonomous and self-
sufficient owner of private property.  
The adulthood that constitutes personhood is principally determined by the 
capacity to possess private property. Until then, how a child is treated and legally 
 
22 Caivano, “Conceptualizing Capacity”, 5 
23 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities : resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 24 January 2007 
24 Gary Teeple. The Riddle of Human Rights. (London: Merlin, 2005), 59-60 
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recognized by society becomes an issue. Determining the meaning of children’s 
rights is caught in a contradiction from the very beginning, argues Lucinda 
Ferguson.25 Though Ferguson refers not to the principle of private property, we 
can read between the lines in light of Teeple’s critique. This contradiction, she 
claims, ends and begins with the social construction of childhood and its relation 
to adulthood. Modern conceptions take children to be distinctly set apart from 
adults by virtue of the former’s dependency and vulnerability. But this 
understanding is always from point of view of adulthood itself, whereby 
guardians’ decisions for their children involve an anticipation of the chidren 
becoming adults. The assumption here is that the child is unable to appreciate the 
meaning of consent and incapable of conforming to the standard conception of 
rational legal capacity of a full adult person. The very way in which we take 
children to be children is not child-centered, claims Ferguson. It is centered, 
rather, on “adulthood” qua relations of private property.  
Some advocates for the rights of children make the case that being 
recognized as a full person goes a long way to being treated with respect as a 
person. This is to say that children without this real recognition as persons are 
thereby prone to abuse as a consequence. The argument suggests that, as a general 
starting point, officially giving rights to children is important for their welfare 
because it causes adults to view them persons and not objectified wards of 
guardianship.26  Steps towards this are varied since the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) in 1989.27 Some 
nations have modified their framework of personhood recognizing the rights of 
‘mature minors’ and their ability to provide consent, offering legitimacy to their 
being recognized as persons with legal capacity. These solutions, though, are 
piecemeal and are usually limited to matters of principle with nominal practical 
 
25 Lucinda Ferguson, “Not Merely Rights for Children but Children's Rights: The Theory Gap and 
the Assumption of the Importance of Children's Rights.” The International Journal of Children's 
Rights 21 no. 2 (2013): 179 
26 ibid. 185 
27 Dalpé, Gratien, Thorogood, Adrian, and Knoppers, Bartha Maria. 2019. “A Tale of Two 
Capacities: Including Children and Decisionally Vulnerable Adults in Biomedical Research.” 
Frontiers in Genetics 10: 289. (2019), 5 
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effect. The central problem with the vision of the UNCRC is that it envisions no 
social institution other than the nuclear family as a means to raise children, which 
only relates to the child as a form of private possession. 
The child is not yet an embodiment of its own private property and hence 
‘selfhood’ as far as personhood is concerned. That children do not meet these 
criteria relegates them to the status their guardian’s possession. Naturally, children 
depend on the parents or parent as wage earners. The specific character of 
possessing children in this way, however, is customarily informed by 
universalized relations of private property ownership, even though the child as 
living being is not legal private property. We can infer this from what Teeple has 
pointed out about the UNCRC. The basic premises of the rights of children is that 
they are born into nuclear families and that parents have the right to determine the 
child’s life course. The ideal expression of this is a household of good treatment, 
material abundance, and the inheritance of private property. But because of the 
natural character ascribed to the institution of the family, it does not occur to the 
UNCRC that the structure of the family is a prism that refracts internally what has 
been imposed on it from the outside. It is an abstraction from concrete social and 
historical circumstances fraught with class struggle, sexism, racism, market 
forces, etc. The real antagonistic social character of private property relations is 
also not considered. But the principle of private property remains the basic 
presumptive form of the family itself. And children are ‘possessed’ in this way.  
 
A final note 
What we can gather from a cursory overview of various treatments of personhood 
is theoretically unstable nature of the status. It is contested on a variety of grounds 
for a variety of different purposes. The following argument approaches the person 
from the point of view of market society. What we want to demonstrate is that the 
various ways in which the question of personhood is tackled from the 
aforementioned points of view are so many expressions of the irreconcilability of 








The following chapter presents the definitions and methodological application of 
key concepts for the argument. These definitions and methodology establish a way 
of thinking about the person in relation to the human being that is applied in the 
following chapters. The methodology and terms of the argument presented here 
are Hegelian and Marxist in orientation. 
 
1.1 Methodology: appearance and essence 
When we confront one another, we believe we do so as human beings. In a market 
society, however, we only do so as persons. Here, three questions follow: why are 
the person and the human not the same? If they are not the same, why do we 
conflate these two terms? And what does this say about a human community that 
takes itself to be something that it is not – a market society of persons?    
 To answer these questions, we begin by methodologically articulating the 
relationship between the person and the human as a dialectic between appearance 
and essence, respectively.  The definitions of essence and appearance are 
determined through their distinction as follows.28 Essence constitutes the 
immutable and unchanging substratum of being. Being’s appearance, on the other 
hand, is mutable and has a fluctuating existence. This realm of being’s appearance 
is inessential because it is not the immutable essence of being. Thus, to take what 
is inessential to be essential would be a category mistake. With respect to the 
relationship between the person and the human, this category mistake is 
ideological and has large social ramifications.  
 This is the conception of ideology for the following argument: the point of 
view that takes appearance – or existence – to be essence. This is not to say that 
 




appearances are mere illusions with no basis in reality. Mentioned above, 
appearance is the realm of mutable existence. Persons do exist, but to take this 
existence to be the essence of the human is to incorrectly take what is mutable to 
be what is immutable.   
 Why is the person only an appearance and not the essence of the human? 
When we apply this dialectic of appearance and essence to social relations 
amongst human, the historical and contingent social formations of human beings 
belong to the realm of appearances. Because market society has a historical 
existence, the social relations between persons in market society belong to the 
realm of appearance. What a human is in essence, however, transcends the bounds 
of market society and any other social formation.  
 We can now articulate with specificity the main problem of this thesis. The 
universalization of market relations has the consequence of concealing the fact 
that relations between persons are of a historical existence. Here, the ideological 
perspective arises when the social existence of persons is taken by immediate 
perception to be the essence of the human being. This means that, within market 
society, humans take themselves to be something that they are not. To confuse the 
essence of the human with the historical existence of the human being entails an 
estranged human community not conscious of what it is as a human community. 
This allows us make sense of the estrangement of human beings in market society.   
   
1.2 Definitions: the human and the person 
We must now distinguish the difference between the person and the human so as 
to grasp why a human community that takes its existence as persons to be the 
essence of the human entails the estrangement of this human community. We must 
therefore define what we mean by the person with respect to the social formation 
in which persons exist: market society.  
There are therefore two realities in marketplace society. There is the reality 
of the person and the reality of the human being. The person is the being whose 
social activity constitutes market relations. This includes buying, selling, 
producing, owning property, etc. These activities all constitute various aspects of 
 
 17 
the commodity production and exchange. The prevailing social relation that 
constitute the social form of persons is the private property relation. It is in this 
respect that our definition of the person is limited. By analyzing the key 
characteristics that constitute the social character of the person, the following 
chapters will demonstrate that the person belongs to market society alone; and that 
the usage of this category for humans in non-market social formations is either an 
incorrect usage or risks attributing the premises of market society to non-market 
social formations. To maintain this distinction, it is necessary from the outset that 
we also provide a definition of the human being. 
If being a human is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a person, it is 
critical that we begin with a distinct definition of the human in a way that will 
allow us to see how the relationship between the person and the human is 
contradictory. We will use a definition of the human offered by Marx, who says 
that the human is  
 
the species-activity and the species-spirit whose real, conscious and authentic 
existence consists in social activity and social enjoyment. Since the essence of 
man is the true community of man, men, by activating their own essence, 
produce, create this human community, this social being which is no abstract, 
universal power standing over against the solitary individual, but is the essence 
of every individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own 
wealth.29  
 
For Marx, the true human community is not a mere product of thought but 
arises out of the needs and the collective activity of individuals who belong to a 
community. The existence of a community does not depend on one individual 
alone. For no human exists as an atomized individual, but always through other 
individuals within a social community through the common social act of labour: 
 
I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the species, thus I 
would be acknowledged by you as the complement of your own being, as an 
essential part of yourself. I would thus know myself to be confirmed in both 
your thoughts and your love.30 
 
29 Karl Marx, “Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy”, in Early Writings, 
trans. Rodney Livingstone, 259-278. (Harmondsworth: Penguin in Association with New Left 
Review, 1992), 265 




This relationship, for Marx, is mutual. What applies for one human applies 
for the other: “my labour would be the free expression and hence the enjoyment of 
life.”31 In this respect, then, when the essence of the human community becomes 
an estranged essence – when a community takes its essence to be something other 
than what it is – this relationships between estranged humans would also be 
mutual: “in the framework of private property it is the alienation of life since I 
work in order to live, in order to procure for myself the means of life. My labour 
is not life… my individuality has been alienated to the point where I loathe this 
activity, it is torture for me.”32  
We have here opposing terms. First, the social being of the person is 
distinct from the social being of the human: when exclusive, antisocial relations 
between persons qua private property owners are not practiced, by definition there 
are social relations between human beings, which include, for instance, relations 
of solidarity between family members, friends, or lovers – if the human is lucky. A 
private, atomized person is not a social, communal human.  
But our analysis is not limited to definitions. Because we are investigating 
existing social relations, we are also investigating social contradictions between 
personhood and humans and hence an existing contradictory unity of market 
relations and human relations. True human relationships are not immune from the 
external pressures of market relations of persons. Market relations of persons are 
neither immune from the human spirit that may resist the prosaic existence of 
private property relations. Nevertheless, because relations of private property are 
the dominant prevailing social relation of market society, human relationships, 
therefore, only possess a limited independence from the sphere of the market. 
From the point of view of market society, market relations are incorrectly 
taken to be the essence of human relations, rather than only the historical 
appearance of relations between persons. Hence, if humans do not recognize 
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themselves as humans, but as something other than what they are in their essence, 
this human community becomes an estranged human community: 
 
To say therefore that man is estranged from himself is identical with the 
statement that the society of this estranged man is the caricature of a true 
community, of his true species-existence, that therefore his activity is a torment 
to him, his own creation confronts him as an alien power, his wealth appears as 
poverty, the essential bond joining him to other men appears inessential, in fact 
separation from other men appear to be his true existence…33 
 
The appearance of exclusive relations of private property, which separate 
the unity of humans into a lifeless multiplicity of persons, is taken as human 
beings’ true essence. Furthermore, personhood is this objectified caricature of the 
true human community that is now an abstract universal power imposed onto this 
community. Personhood conceives this community of social mutuality in terms of 
private relations of exchange and trade. What is here meant by ‘society’, 
therefore, is this caricature. Society refers to market society, where persons are 
bound by the private property relation.34 
It follows from the estrangement of the genuine human community that the 
contradiction between the human and the person is understood as the contradiction 
between the human community and the market society of persons, respectively. 
Because we have identified the relationship between the person and the human not 
only as a contradiction in terms, but as an existing contradictory unity between 
two social realities, it remains to be explained how the human being, through a 




The category of the person is a reflection of the economic relations of market 
society; and these relations are but historical appearances taken to be the natural, 
immutable essence of the human being. How are these market relations 
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naturalized to appear as the essence of human relations? Investigating the nature 
of society always begins with the investigation of relationships, and we must 
consider the social processes through which humans become persons. 
 We previously presented the methodological distinction between 
appearance and essence, and for the purposes of this argument we identified the 
relations between persons as an historical appearance while the species activity of 
the true human community that produces itself as a social community is an 
essence. Depending on the historical and material circumstances of these human 
relations, however, the essence of these human relations become an estranged 
essence. We must identify, then, the social process of human relations that become 
estranged human relations qua relations between persons. In other words, we want 
to understand the process through which the human being becomes estranged 
through his or her transformation into a person, what is called personification. 
Personification refers to a real, living role that these human beings are 
playing as owners of commodities, if at least only one’s labour-power. Take, for 
example, the relationship between the activity of a judge and that of a lawyer, 
which in turn constitutes their personified social roles as judge and lawyer. Here, 
the relationship between judge and lawyer “do not appear as direct social relations 
between persons in their work, but rather as material [dinglich] relations between 
persons and social relations between objects,”35 writes Marx. This is no longer a 
direct relationship between two humans, but a relationship between humans 
mediated by commodities (in this case labour-power). Hence, in marketplace 
society, human relations appear as something they are not, which are relations 
between “an immense collection of commodities”.36  
By invoking the term ‘personification’, Marx is stipulating the active role 
a human embodies in relation to commodities, which are actions and behaviours 
that really appear before human beings but are taken as the essential state of 
 
35 Marx, Capital, 166 
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affairs of humanity.37 What is the relationship between the commodity and its 
personified owner that determines this market behaviour? Marx writes that  
 
commodities cannot themselves go to market and person exchange in their own 
right. We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians, who are the 
possessors of commodities.  Commodities are things, and therefore lack the 
power to resist man. If they are unwilling, he can use force; in other words, he 
can take possession of them. In order that these objects may enter into relation 
with each other as commodities, their guardians must place themselves in 
relation to one another as persons whose will resides in those objects…38 
 
The ‘will’ that resides in these commodities refers to the fact that these 
commodities must find movement through social relations of exchange. We must 
therefore explain the social character of this exchange relation determined by the 
commodity form. This is the force that socially binds us all as personifications of 
economic relations.   
 Suppose the value of a table is equal to the total value of two dresses. But 
a table is a table and a dress is a dress. By looking at the use-values of these 
commodities alone we cannot determine their values in relation to one another. 
For we must find a common element that both products of labour share such that 
they can be equal and exchangeable as commodities. First, this common element 
is that both commodities are products of labour, but this only means that these are 
two entirely different kinds of labour each with their own respective social 
character. There is no concrete equality between a carpenter and a dress maker in 
skill or function of their product. We have an existing contradiction, therefore, 
between the two different kinds of useful labour whose differentiated use-values 
synthetically produce a common element by way of abstraction. In order to find a 
common element, we must abstract from the incommensurable concrete social 
qualities of their labours and their products. Both products then bear a value 
measured by the magnitude of a given amount of socially necessary labour time. 
In the time it takes to make one table, two dresses are made. Both commodities 
then emerge as a relation to each other in the form of an equivalence of value 
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because they all share an identical social substance that produces value, which is 
labour. The common value is ‘labour in the abstract’, whose substance is entirely 
social and real. This is the objective, yet abstract character of the value-relation, 
which is a pure social relation because “not an atom of matter enters into the 
objectivity of commodities as values; it is the direct opposite of the coarsely 
sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical bodies.”39 
With the intervention of a given quantity of money, their values are both 
related to one another through a universal equivalent. Through a unique 
commodity, money, whose only use-value is exchange, all commodities equal one 
another. This is because money embodies a given magnitude of socially necessary 
labour time that functions as a universal equivalent to the value of all 
commodities, placing them in relation to one another. All socially distinct kinds of 
labour are now bound by this abstraction and can enter into exchange.  
Because all these commodities have a common element, which is value, 
they may all come into relation with each other and thereby be exchanged. Value 
here now appears as exchange-value. As Marx writes, these commodities “must 
all change hands. But this changing hands constitutes their exchange, and their 
exchange puts them in relation with each other as values and realizes them as 
values.”40  This is a real social relation that admits the social form of being in 
commodity producing society. It follows that only through this abstraction, what is 
called the value-relation, that producers find movement in the market as they 
come into a relation of equivalence with each other as well, since their labour-
power is also their own commodity.  
It must be noted that this abstraction does not originate in mind. It is a real, 
socially synthetic product of the material contradiction between two 
incommensurate use-values that have a common social substance. Only in this 
manner can it be a common, universalized social force that binds market beings 
together as one massive abstract social relation of production and exchange. The 
carpenter and the dress maker do not know that this abstract and objective value-
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relation is how they are socially bound together. All they see before them are their 
idiosyncratic desires and the material shells of their own commodities – including 
their concrete human shells of their own commodity of labour power. This is how 
commodities stand between us all. This is what is meant by object relations 
between humans. 
As personifications of commodities, writes Marx, we “exist for one 
another merely as representatives and hence owners, of commodities. As we 
proceed to develop our investigation, we shall find, in general, that the characters 
who appear on the economic stage are merely personifications of economic 
relations; it is as bearers of these economic relations that they come into contact 
with each other.”41 Because commodities cannot get up on their own accord to 
exchange themselves, owners must bring them to market so that they may be 
realized as values. This is the value-relation that constitutes the movement 
between persons as personifications of their commodities. 
The value relation is a social activity that ‘transcends sensuousness’, is 
‘supra-sensible’, or is ‘super-natural’, to invoke some of Marx’s terms. First, it is 
supra-sensible because ‘not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of 
commodities as values’ and since, as values, we are referring to a real common 
social substance that brings us into a common social relation of exchange, this 
abstraction is real. This has been given the terminological distinction of ‘real 
abstraction’ by Alfred Sohn-Rethel.42 Alberto Toscano distinguished this from an 
intellectual notion of abstraction, describing it as a “vision of abstraction that, 
rather than depicting it as a structure of illusion, recognizes it as a social, 
historical, and trans-individual phenomenon.”43The value relation is therefore an 
abstract but real social force that engenders market society with a universal 
character where the category of the person becomes a modality of social existence 
with a universal significance: 
 
41 ibid. 179 
 42 Alfred Sohn-Rethel. Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology. (Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1978) 





Since it transfers private property into the very being of man, it can no longer be 
conditioned by local or national features of private property as something 
existing outside it. It (political economy) develops a cosmopolitan, universal 
energy which breaks through every limitation and bond and sets itself up as the 
only policy, the only universality, the only limitation and the only bond.44 
  
1.4 The juridical person 
We must consider the relationship between personifications of commodities and 
the category of the person itself. A note must be made here about Marx’s 
terminology. The way Marx uses the term ‘personification’ [Personifikation] is 
related to another term. The other term used here is ‘bearer’, translated from the 
German Träger. Marx’s use of Träger is appropriate as this is the German word 
used to describe the legal person [Rechtssubjekt/Rechtsperson] as the ‘bearer’ of 
rights and duties. In the German language, tragen is also the appropriate verb in 
the sense of ‘wearing’ a mask. This linguistic connection is lost to English as it is 
not common parlance to say that one can also ‘wear’ rights and duties; but it is 
possible to say that one ‘bears a mask’. 
The terms Personifikation and Träger mirror one another. For Marx, the 
Träger is the ‘bearer’ of the commodity who compensates for the commodity’s 
lack of the five or more senses of the human being without which the commodity 
would not make it to market.45 Owners must bear [tragen] these commodities so 
that they may be traded on the market; hence their ‘personification’ is this 
‘bearing’ of these commodities. The human being becomes a person bearing 
[tragen] rights and duties by wearing [tragen] the commodity form as a mask. The 
will – or the ‘voice’ – that sounds through this mask resides in the commodity 
itself and not the human being. The senses of the human come under the necessity 
of the commodity as it takes on a life of its own. 
This point allows us to understand the relationship between personification 
and the concept of the person. According to Marx, the juridical relation between 
 
44 Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.” In Early Writings, trans. Rodney 
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‘legal persons’ within a commodity producing society, specifically a capitalist one, 
finds determination through the process of commodity exchange.46 The will of the 
juridical person is not the will of the human being, but a juridical reflection of the 
personified will that resides in the commodity. Legally denoting a private relation 
to our social needs and the means of life, each person must behave in such a way 
that does not arbitrarily appropriate the commodity of other persons. 
Appropriation and alienation of property is only possible through the mode of 
consent or contract, which takes up a juridical character in market society 
whereby both private owners of commodities recognize one another as capable of 
exchanging as legal persons.  
The legal person is a historical reflection of the personification of 
economic relations. On this basis alone it does not refer to the essence of the 
human being, not to mention that some humans have been and continue to be 
excluded from this category. But the universalization of market relations and 
suffrage go a long way to make it appear as though our social existence as persons 
is our essence as humans. This is the logic of commodity fetishism at work in the 
way we come to understand ourselves as humans transformed into persons.  
Variations of the concept of the person are fetishized as “autonomous 
figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each 
other and with the human race.”47 The person thus becomes one of the most 
important “categories of bourgeois economics [consisting] precisely of forms of 
this kind. They are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore 
objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined 
mode of social production.”48 Only the personified activity of society can put the 
category of the person at its center, and thus turn it into a specific socially valid 
category for social regulation. 
As a socially valid category, we must provide an historical analysis of the 
category of the person in order to situate its logical relation to private property and 
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essential differentiation from the human being. This begins with Roman civil law. 
“In reality,” writes Pashukanis, “the hardest core of legal haziness…is to be found 
precisely in the sphere of civil law. It is here above all that the legal subject, the 
‘persona’ finds entirely adequate embodiment in the real person of the subject 
operating egotistically, the owner, the bearer of private interests.”49  Thereafter it 
will be possible to derive the modern significance of the category of the person 





























Four Moments of the Person 
 
We approach the category of the person not only as a concept but also a social 
relation imbedded in market society. In this way, we approach the category 
according to four key relational moments of such a society. By moments we are 
referring to essential but partial aspects of the person’s constitution as a whole. 
They can be thought of as levels that accord to a particular logic, although 
‘moment’ is not taken here to be temporal.  
 Three moments of the person to which we refer are the legal, egoistic, and 
moral. The moments of the concept of the person are reflections of various 
moments in existing social relations between persons. A fourth moment addresses 
the person taken as if a human. This moment is unique as it entails the 
naturalization of other three moments of personhood, taken as if the legal, 
egoistic, and moral relation constituted what it means to be a human. 
Methodologically, when we refer, for example, to the ‘egoistic person’, we are 
analyzing the person in this isolated moment reflecting a particular dimension of 
market relations. The relationship between the legal person and the moral person, 
therefore, denotes a relationship between these two moments stipulated within 
personhood in general.  
 With this in mind, none of these moments are reducible to one another but 
are related to one another in a dialectic movement. If political economy and social 
relations develop unevenly over history, this is also true for the category of the 
person in market society.  
 The reason why we take these three moments of the person to be 
irreducible to one another is due to the nature of private property itself. Brenna 
Bhandar points out that to posit property as a general category is an abstraction 
from the historical development of property relations. To define bourgeois private 
property, for example, would be to only to define the relations that persist within 
bourgeois society. Thus, to define private property as an independent category 
detached from its historical appearance, as bourgeois society so often does, is little 
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more than a jurisprudential illusion.50 This is where, as Pashukanis notes, the 
“concept of property loses any living meaning and renounces its pre-juridical 
history.”51 We must be careful, then, not to speak about the legal person as the 
single most powerful reflection of the commodity form. Insofar as we define the 
person in terms of property ownership, we approach the problem of personhood 
through the relations in which personhood as a property relation is expressed in 
other moments of market society.  
 Approaching the problem of personhood from the point of view of legal, 
egoistic, and moral relations is cued by Marx, who asserts these aspects of the 
market relation to be fundamental. This argument brings this reading into 
conversation with the concept of the person:  
 
Finally, man as he is a member of civil society is taken to be real man, man as 
distinct from citizen, since he is man in his sensuous, individual and immediate 
existence, whereas political man is simply abstract, artificial man, man as an 
allegorical, moral person. Actual man is acknowledged only in the form of the 
egoistic individual and true man only in the form of the abstract citizen.52 
 
Writing on the juridical reflection of the commodity form, Pashukanis writes that                                          
 
Man as a moral subject, that is as a personality of equal worth, is indeed no 
more than a necessary condition, for exchange according to the law of value. 
Man as a legal subject, or as a property owner, is a further necessary condition. 
Finally, these two stipulations are extremely closely connected with a third, in 
which man figures as a subject operating egoistically.53 
 
The moral, egoistic, and legal subject express various moments of the 
totality of the market relation but they do so only in contradiction with one 
another. The unfettered egoistic person sticks to his or her naked economic 
calculation and is concerned solely for his or herself and pays other persons no 
mind. Rugged competition is the character of the egoistic person. The atomized 
 
50 Brenna Bhandar, Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership. 
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legal person armed with rights confirms this position of egoism. On the other 
hand, however, the legal dimension of personhood also protects other persons 
such that the actions of the egoistic person are restricted insofar as the exchange 
process is respected, that no property is alienated without mutual consent between 
private persons. But because egoistic persons owe nothing to the universal (law), 
they must willingly forsake their self-interested pretensions insofar as the act of 
mutual and equal exchange is possible at all. Hence, there is also a moral 
dimension whereby persons oblige themselves ‘freely’ to the law, without which 
the law would appear to be strictly coercive force compromising a person’s 
individuality. Moral persons, hence, recognize each other as if they were equal.  
It is important to qualify Pashukanis’ emphasis on the moral relation as a 
reflection of equivalence in market exchange, which is somewhat reductive. For 
Marx, the moral relation is much more than this. The moral relation is an 
abstraction of the whole of market society. In this respect, the moral relation is 
that moment of negation where the egoistic persons must act as if it has stakes 
within a transcendent social whole beyond its own private interests.       
Section 2.1 analyzes the historical context of the legal person as an owner 
of private property in Roman civil law. Here we can identify the historical 
condition in which the category of persona becomes a legal codification of private 
property ownership. 
 Section 2.2 looks at the historic origins of the philosophical conflation of 
the person and the human being. We observe how the material conditions of 
market society affect Stoic thought in such a way that they postulate the social 
existence of the person to be the essence of the human. The person taken as 
human is important to the argument as it is an ideological naturalization of market 
relations into the human being as such. When relations of private property become 
increasingly universalized, the Stoic theory of natural law postulates that all 
humans are naturally instantiated as private owners of themselves.  
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 address the egoistic and moral moments of the 
personhood, respectively. These conceptual and behavioral qualities of 
personhood correspond to a more intensified commodity producing society of the 
 
 30 
early modern period. This discussion on the category of the person is not an 
historical survey as much as it is designed to show that certain historical concepts 
we take for granted today are reflections of historical market relation rather than 
natural givens.  
Sections 2.1 through 2.4 also demonstrate what these moments of the 
person mean for the human being. This is shown in each case as a contradictory 
relation from which the human being, when embodying the social existence of the 
person, becomes abstracted and estranged from his or her existence in a 
fundamental way.  
Investigating these core moments of personhood help us understand how 
persons constitute the movement of market relations and how our social bond 
through the value relation leaves the human bond estranged. Through these 
various conceptions of the persons we will be able to see how, in each case, not 
only do they constitute the internal contradiction of market relations themselves, 
and hence personhood, but also the external contradiction with the human being.  
A final point must be made. The following moments of personhood are all 
unified in contradiction with one another. These contradictions internal to 
personhood are but various outward expressions of the contradiction within 
private property itself. Gillian Rose writes,  
 
 Private property is a contradiction, because an individual’s private or 
particular possession can only be guaranteed by the whole society, the 
universal. The universal is the community. This guarantee makes possession 
into property. Property means the right to exclude others, and the exclusion of 
other individuals (particular) is made possible by the communal will (universal). 
But, if everyone has an equal right to possess, to exclude others, then no-one 
can have any guaranteed possession, or, anyone’s possession belongs equally to 
everyone else.54 
 
Understanding how personhood reflects this social contradiction within the 
form of private property itself, we will derive the estrangement of humans from 
their social existence as persons as a way to explain why some humans are 
 




excluded from personhood. For only human beings who can transform into 
personifications of their commodities can become persons. This entails a socially 
fragmented human community that is at odds with itself, internally divided by an 
abstract dichotomy between person and non-person, entailed in the relation 
between the person and private property.  
 
2.1 The Legal Person 
The contemporary legal person has historic origins in the political economic 
development of market forces in ancient Rome. While relations of private 
property and forms of law did precede this epoch, the expansion and intensity of 
private property relations and legal relations in the Roman Republic and the 
Empire acquired a novel regulatory and systematized quality hitherto unknown. 
The category of the person emerges here as a codified legal category denoting the 
de jure owner of private property. As Marx writes,  
 
The chief preoccupation of the Romans was to develop and determine the 
abstract relations pertaining to private property. The actual foundation of 
private property, ownership, was a fact, an inexplicable fact with no basis in 
law. It only assumed the character of rightful ownership, of private property, by 
virtue of the legal determination which society bestowed upon the mere fact of 
possession.55 
 
Historically, the legal form emerges out of informal contract relations in 
small-scale commodity production; and when commodity exchange relations take 
on a pervasive social character, the formal regulations acquire a comprehensive 
and codified legal system. This development of the legal form is coterminous with 
a system of production oriented towards exchange and not production alone.  
Two comprehensive codified legal systems of the sort appear in Western 
history: in ancient Rome and the early modern period. The following chapter 
considers the former. To the Romans we credit the basic foundations of thinking 
law in general: codified law, systematic jurisprudence, legal capacity, legal 
abstraction, absolute private property, and the category of the person [persona]. 
 
55 Karl Marx, “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State” in Early Writings, 179 
 
 32 
Kurki points out that the formal taxonomy of the persona-res distinction passed 
down from the Romans remains the ‘deep structure’ of law today, although he is 
unable to explain why this is the case. Pashukanis, on the other hand, makes sense 
of this, writing that “the fundamental trains of thought of Roman jurists have 
retained their significance up to the present day and have remained the ratio 
scripta of every commodity-producing society.”56 It is therefore worth our efforts 
to investigate not merely a history of Roman jurisprudence, but the specific 
appearance of the legal form of personhood as general abstraction reflecting the 
value relation of the exchange process.  “Private property is the child of Roman 
reason…,”57 writes Marx, and every time we refer to each other as ‘persons’ in the 
West we bear this mark of the Roman reason and private property.  
We must point out that not all Western legal systems are modeled after 
Roman civil law. Hegel, Marx, and Pashukanis are writing within Napoleonic and 
Germanic traditions heavily influenced by Roman civil law. The purpose of 
explicating the legal development of the category of the person in ancient Rome is 
to demonstrate the important political economic foundation of the legal form and 
the category of the person in general, and that certain degrees of market 
abstractions play a fundamental role in shaping the concept of the person in 
general.  
 
2.1.1 Historical context 
The legal category of the person arose against the background of an intensifying 
Roman imperial expansion of commodity producing society. During expansion 
Romans confronted non-Romans with whom they would exchange, and the law 
had to account for the status of these non-Romans. Here followed a principled 
development in Roman law was the conceptual legal division between ius gentium 
and ius civile.58 In his Institutes, Gaius defines Civil Law [ius civile] as the 
particular laws of the Roman state concerning Roman citizens alone. He defines 
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Natural Law [ius gentium] as the natural law of reason established and observed 
by all peoples in and outside the Empire. Ius gentium was neither a legal code nor 
a body of statute law, but a customary law of rational conformity which was in 
great measure intellectually authored by dominant Stoic philosophy of the time. 
The development of Roman legal categories of persons and property in 
civil law initially had more to do with eastward expansion. Unlike Latin 
colonization of an un-civilized Western Europe, conquest of the Near East was 
diplomatically discrete. Greek colonial expansion had already proliferated a 
network of Hellenized urban foundations and market economies with a long prior 
history of developed civilization.59 Rome’s initial intervention in the Near East 
was a careful appropriation of existing structures as client states rather than 
conquered provinces in the West. The significant innovation of Roman rule in the 
East was in the Greek city states where property qualifications were imposed for 
municipal offices in order to align them with the oligarchical norms of the Eternal 
City. This gave juridical codification to their well-established de facto rule.  
These political economic forces brought about a qualitative change in 
social regulation within the expansive market economy. What was once de facto 
power is now de jure power. Gradually developing from 300 BCE, a civil law 
system emerged as a comprehensive unity that was ushered in and fundamentally 
oriented by economic transactions: purchase, sale, hire, lease, inheritance, and 
security. The bulk of Republican jurisprudence was concerned with governing 
suits between disputing parties over property. Around this, legal theory emerged 
as the activity not of state functionaries or lawyers but of aristocratic jurists 
guiding decisions of the judiciary based on abstract principles rather than matters 
of fact. Social relations, it follows, were no longer strict matters of fact but 
principled de jure relations. The cumulative result of abstract contractual figures 
that could be applied to particular commercial activities and social interactions 
was, for the first time in history, reflected in an organized body of jurisprudence.60 
By the time of the later Republic, imperial expansion of commodity exchange 
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relations based on slavery found a juridical reflection whereby all such relations 
would be regulated through codified law and facilitated through abstract legal 
principles. 
The emergence of a codified legal system in Rome was a superstructural 
reflection of the exchange relation between commodity owners who ‘appear on 
the economic stage’ in an increasingly formalized manner.  When informal (de 
facto) relations of exchange are codified, the social act of exchange adopts formal 
de jure expression between owners. Furthermore, like the property qualification of 
political authority, the de facto relation of the domination of slaves now becomes 
de jure through codification.  And that some humans are dominated de jure 
necessarily implies that others are de jure non-dominated; with the former as 
owned and the latter owner. Domination and inequality thus become ‘legal-ized’, 
out of which a formal world of ‘equality’ for some arises for some against a 
backdrop of real ‘inequality’ for others. 
This legally formalized concept of private property ownership 
distinguished Rome from previous Mediterranean societies. This legal abstraction 
was not present in previous market economies and legal systems. Whereas 
Greece, Persia, or Egypt may have had some form of private or individuated 
property, the character of ownership was always a ‘relative’ matter of fact of 
qualified and conditional possession.  Roman jurisprudence, on the other hand, 
liberated the concept of private property from extrinsic qualifications by 
abstracting a distinction between ‘possession’ and ‘property’. The former was a 
mere relationship of factual control of goods while the latter was the full, 
unconditional, and unqualified abstract relation to goods, or a title.61  
Roman levels of commodity production and exchange entailed more 
abstract forms of social regulation in market society. If legal codification now 
entailed a substrate of abstract principles, it is because these principles reflect the 
real abstraction of an expanded value-relation. Domination of private property, 
therefore, becomes an abstract domination with a perfectly real basis in social life. 
For the Romans, ownership was dominium, referring not only to crude objects but 
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also human beings objectified as slaves and hence a real social domination. For 
this reason, the fact that private property is a category of a type of social relation 
of domination is found in the Roman legal term itself. But this is concealed to us 
moderns by the translation ‘absolute property’. The Latin name of this Roman 
achievement was dominium ex jure Quiritium.  
 
2.1.2 Absolute property 
The phrasing of dominium ex jure Quiritium roughly refers to the legal 
domination (of property) for the Roman citizen. Quirinus was the name of an 
early Roman god of the state. Lore has it that Romulus had mysteriously 
disappeared for some time after founding Rome, only to return and proclaim 
himself to be this very god, Quirinus, thereafter becoming a legendary deified 
king. Afterwards, Roman citizens in their peacetime functions were called 
“Quirites”. Ius Quiritium in Roman law referred to full Roman citizenship and 
hence the full right as a Quiritarian owner of private property. Quiritarian 
ownership, in effect, denotes Quiritarian personhood.  
The essential feature of Quiritarian ownership distinguished between 
absolute property and mere factual possession. It is probable that this conceptual 
development was related to the fact that certain objects of private property could 
not be conveniently brought to court or exchanged between literal hands and a 
degree of abstraction was required in order to exchange private property. 
Nevertheless, this form of private ownership would come to encompass the main 
concept of private property.  
The abstraction of absolute property from the empirical world of factual 
possession can be shown as follows. I can gift a flock of sheep to my neighbour 
by physically bringing the flock to his land, after which he would assume full 
ownership of the flock. This would be a ‘relative’ form of private property through 
factual possession. But Quiritarian property cannot be transferred in such a way. If 
I were to deliver my neighbour a slave, he would be in possession of the slave, but 
the slave would remain mine ex iure Quiritium. In other words, I would have to 
transfer to my neighbour a legal title to the slave by abstraction.  
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Another important feature of Quiritarian ownership marking the difference 
between factual possession and absolute property is the assertion of vindicatio. If 
absolute ownership is the unrestricted right of control over a physical thing, the 
owner may claim this title no matter who possesses it, be it stolen or appropriated 
by accident. If my neighbour possesses a slave that I own by Quiritarian right, all 
that I must do is prove my title to the slave and my neighbour must give it up. It is 
not necessary for me to allege that my neighbour has done anything wrong in 
coming to possess the slave. On the other hand, all that my neighbour has to do is 
wait for me to prove my right to the slave, until which time my neighbour remains 
its possessor.62  
Because absolute private property cannot be transferred by empirical fact 
of possession, the exchange relation itself is legally reflected in an abstract 
manner. For instance, two methods of transferring Quiritarian ownership are 
mancipatio and the ritual claim of in iure cessio. Mancipatio is a sale pocked with 
what on the surface appears to be ‘symbolic elements’. Two parties of the 
transaction are present (the transferor and transferee), at least five witnesses who 
were Roman citizens above the age of puberty, a pair of scales held by another 
citizen of full age, and a piece of copper. The transferee would hold onto the 
commodity, say a slave, and say “I assert that this man is mine according to 
Quiritarian right, and be he bought to me with this piece of copper and these 
copper scales,”  often including the words “at the price of…”63 The transferee 
would then strike the scales with the piece of copper and give it to the transferor, 
representing real money. The inversion of this is in iure cessio. Parties stand 
before a magistrate of the people and the transferee grasps onto the slave and says, 
“I assert that this man is mine by Quiritarian right,” and the magistrate then asks if 
the transferor would assert the same right. The transferor either remains silent or 
says “no”, in which case the magistrate adjudicates the slave to the transferee64.     
 
62 Ibid. 142 
63 Ibid.145 
64 Ibid. 150 
 
 37 
We can detect here the money fetish at work in the exchange relation that 
gives rise to the legal ‘status’ of the person. As Marx writes, “the fact that money 
can, in certain functions, be replaced by mere symbols of itself, gave rise to 
another mistaken notion, that it is itself a mere symbol”65 as a purely instrumental 
function of exchange. Taken merely as a symbol, the real social character that 
gives value to money is concealed behind the sensuous appearance of the money 
form.  
As the legal concept of the person is constituted through what is taken to 
be a ‘symbolic’ act of exchange, the concrete social character of the human being 
remains concealed as the personification of the will of commodities takes its place 
in the legal relation. This allows us to distinguish between the personification of 
commodities and the conceptual legal ‘status’ of the person. The ‘status’ of the 
person also appears as a ‘symbol’ in the sense of being a conceptual legal category 
for the mere functional purpose of regulating exchange relations. Like the money 
fetish, what it concealed behind this conceptual ‘status’ is that personification in 
the exchange process is the real abstract objectification of value as a social 
relation. The status of the person appears to function instrumentally like the 
sensuous appearance of the money form. All persons are formally rendered equal, 
concealing the fact that humans’ position in the value relation is what actually 
determines their status as persons.  
 
2.1.3 Absolute person 
Ownership of absolute private property necessarily entails a category of the kind 
of being that can own property in a likewise absolute manner. Moreover, because 
private property stipulates a relation to a material object, it likewise stipulates 
another person’s relation to that same object and its owner. The unconditional, 
abstract character of this relation determines the social form of being that 
personhood is. We will discuss how this determines the social form of the person 
in two ways – an external way and an internal way. This will show, too, how the 
relations between persons entails the estrangement of relations between humans.  
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First, there is the social form of the person that is atomized in the external 
sense. It is through the market that the relations between persons as private social 
entities are constituted and nothing more. As Hegel writes, “for Personality 
constitutes the fundamental condition of legal Right: it appears chiefly in the 
category of Property, but it is indifferent to the concrete characteristic of the living 
Spirit with which individuality is concerned.”66 Hegel is here saying that the 
person stands in contradiction with the concrete existence of the human being as a 
member of the genuine human community. Because absolute private property 
abstracts the property relation from a ‘relative’ or factual existence in the world, 
so too is the social form of the person that owns this kind form of property 
abstracted from the concrete social characteristics of the human. This abstraction 
is the basis upon which persons are legally bound. In other words, persons are 
legally bound in the basis of standing in contradiction to the human being.  
The binding force between legal persons reflects the binding force of the 
value relation. Marx says that “equality in the full sense between different kinds of 
labour can be arrived at only if we abstract from their real inequality, if we reduce 
them to the characteristic they all have in common,” that of human labour in the 
abstract. Because the end goal of commodity production is exchange, the 
personified human also has his or her own special commodity – labour power. But 
the value of labour power stems from the fact that labour creates value. What 
follows is that labour power is the capacity to create value that can be exchanged. 
It is the value relation inscribed by labour power that brings different labours in 
relation to one another forming a bond between persons.67 The value relation 
produces this social existence of the person as an embodiment of value to be 
exchanged on the market. The juridical status of persons as owners of private 
property is the conceptual reflection of a mutual recognition between two 
equivalent capacities to produce value for the market.  
This external relation between persons also entails an inner reality of the 
juridical person. A person’s external capacity to produce value is internally 
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reflected in the juridical concept of legal capacity. This is the second way in which 
the transformation into a person is an abstraction from the human. Legal capacity 
refers to a mental measure of the legal person. Here, the notion of a private owner 
entails epistemological postulates. It stipulates the kind of rational ability that a 
person must be capable of demonstrating in order to participate in market 
exchange relations and is therefore directly related to personification. “We mean 
by labour-power, or labour-capacity,” writes Marx, “the aggregate of those mental 
and physical capabilities existing in the physical form, the living personality, of a 
human being, capabilities which he sets in motion whenever he produces a use-
value of any kind.”68 Because the owner of labour power has become this 
embodiment of value production, the legal person also becomes a juridical-
psychological abstraction. 
Legal capacity also plays a role in determining who is accepted and 
rejected from personhood on this basis. Going as far back as Rome, some human 
beings held personhood status in full, some partially, and some not at all on the 
basis of capacity.  By definition, the full person of ius civile, possesses full 
capacity and thereby is an owner of private property in the absolute sense. This 
person is a Roman-born male citizen, is alive, is sentient, and has rationality.  Yet 
there are the conditions that also stipulate partial or whole incapacity for 
personhood. In Rome, men and women reached some form of higher personhood 
upon puberty and acquired the higher status of ‘minor’ until a later age of full 
personhood. The transition into adulthood and therefore full personhood depended 
on the ability to know the meaning of right and wrong with respect to the moral 
framework of private property relations. Infants were, etymologically, those 
without language (fari) and were thus not rationally capable of legal acts, delictual 
liability. This exemption from delictal liability remained until the child was old 
enough to understand the meaning of right and wrong. Those deemed mentally ill, 
weak-minded, or dangerous, were classified under furosi and were wholly 
incapable of personhood and thus required the appointment of a curator, though 
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the law did recognize these humans as capable persons within intervals of lucid 
sanity.69   
As a psychological postulate, legal capacity is imposed on the legal subject 
such that the individual self-consciously identifies with the category of the person 
as a being who can enter into contract. The human mind is contradicted insofar as 
the legal capacity of the person is an abstraction from the concrete nature of the 
human. If legal capacity is an objectification and abstraction of the mind, there is 
nothing particularly human that necessitates personhood. On this basis it is 
possible to then exclude persons based on certain mental characteristics.   
The legal capacity in this sense refers only to the capacity to affirm the 
validity of commodity transactions, with private property as its rational, but alien 
substrate.  The social substance of humans is barred from the abstract universe of 
the legal personhood because the very terms of personhood is an individual’s 
capacity to produce value and thereby become a personification of market 
relations.  It is the moment that the personified human being “has become the 
tense essence of private property.”70 So where personifications mirror one another 
on the market through the equivalence of value, persons of equal status mirror 
each other as so many atomized capacities for rights and duties on the market.  
Because the legal person refers to this tense essence of private property 
alone and not the human being, “legal personality,” writes Hegel, “thus learns 
rather that it is without any substance, since the alien content makes itself 
authoritative in it, and does so because that content is the reality of such 
personality.”71 The loss of this social substance is felt by a civil society in which 
some humans carry the status of persons while other humans carry that of private 
property, i.e. slaves. This distinction and contradiction is identifiable in a market 
society that has yet to acquire a universalized social significance. In the following 
section, we will investigate the synthetic result of this contradiction between the 
human being and person of positive law. The attempt to reconcile this 
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contradiction appears in the form of natural law, which instantiates all human 
beings as inherently persons, or owners of private property.  
 
2.2 The Person taken as if Human 
We have demonstrated that the original meaning of the person strictly entailed an 
owner of private property and was not conflated with the human being. After all, 
some humans, such as slaves, women, or children, were property and could 
therefore not be persons. Legally codified market relations on a smaller scale 
would have rendered this distinction between persons and human explicit. But 
when Roman expansion and commodity exchange relations would eventually 
become a universalized social form that also included foreigners, it would 
naturally appear as though persons were also always human such that certain 
Roman thinkers would begin to assert that all humans are constituted by the 
inherent dignity of personhood. The following section investigates the historical 
shift in the concept of legal personhood that would philosophically naturalize the 
appearance of the person as the essence of the human being in a way that both 
terms to this day are often used interchangeably.  
This section approaches this conflation of the person and the human from 
the Roman Stoic perspective. The Stoics take the category of the person to be the 
essence of the human by asserting that all humans are humans because they own 
at least one thing – the ‘self’.  
This analysis of the conflation of the human and the person opens the way 
for sections 2.3 and 2.4. Once personifications of commodities are reflected in the 
concepts of the legal person and asserts the synonymity of the human and the 
person, the door is left open in the early modern period to postulate the egoistic 
person and the moral person as essential characteristics of the ‘human’.  
 
2.2.1 Taking the person as if it were a human   
An expanding marketplace society determined the content of prevailing 
philosophies in Rome. This is evident in the tenets of Stoicism that bear the mark 
of the principles of marketplace society. In their account of what it means to be a 
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human [anthropos], the premises of personhood are inscribed. The Stoic notion of 
anthropos is asserted as a normative category on the basis that personhood is not a 
status solely ascribed by positive law of human creation but is the inherently 
dignified and divine constitution of the human being alone. According to the 
Stoics, the human being is a natural private owner of the self and therefore 
possesses a natural basis for the assertion of moral rights and equality. The Stoics’ 
systematic contribution to Roman jurisprudence with respect to the inherent 
personhood of all human beings marked the first developed theory of natural law.  
The assertion of natural personhood of the human being must be 
considered against the backdrop of Roman conquest. This conquest was first and 
foremost a conquest of marketplace society over ancient communal formations in 
Europe that consisted of inclusive human to human relationships not based on 
private property. Marketplace society tears these communal relations apart and 
introduces relations of private property yielding class inequalities. This 
destruction of the human community is reflected in Stoic philosophy that often 
emphasizes the loss of humanity that therefore must be rediscovered through 
reason and natural law. For the Stoics, to be detached from one’s own humanity is 
to omit one’s self-knowledge as a human who is a part of a community72 Only in a 
marketplace society where many humans are excluded from prevailing market 
relations does the need to rediscover an inherent human dignity arise.  
The person taken as human in this tradition bears similarities to modern 
usages of ‘human’ – even though we really mean ‘person’ - when we speak of 
what is incumbent on or due to other ‘humans’. It is an inclusive view that all 
humans are unconditionally worthy of the rights of personhood.  As a result, the 
Stoic anthropos takes personifications of market relations to be the essence of the 
human.  
The Stoic conflation of the person and the human was observed by Marcel 
Mauss. “I think that this effort,” writes Mauss, “this step forward, came about 
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above all with the help from the Stoics, whose voluntarist and personal ethics 
were able to enrich the Roman notion of the ‘person’ (personne), and was even 
enriched itself whilst enriching the law.”73 With respect to Mauss observation, 
classicist A.A. Long confirms that the Stoics were the first to attribute self-
consciousness as the attribute par excellence of a person as a moral and legal 
entity. In a way that resembles Locke, writes Long, the Stoic view held that “first, 
every human individual is the natural and rightful owner of at least one thing – 
himself or herself; second, that human nature inclines individual human beings to 
acquire private property and to interact with one another as property owners.”74    
The principles of an inherent self-ownership and inclination to acquire 
private property take on a universalized ethical form with the expansion of market 
society. “The idea,” writes Pashukanis, “that all people are equal, possessing the 
same ‘soul’, that they all have the capacity to be legal subjects, and so forth - was 
forced on the Romans by the practice of trade with foreigners…”75 What is 
hereafter lost upon the universalization of this ethical norm is the original 
distinction between the person as a technical category of private property 
ownership and the human being. On the premise that reason - the rational capacity 
of personhood - is common to all humans, Cicero could affirm that “however one 
defines man, the same definition applies to us all.”76 We can observe this 
conflation of the person with the human in writing, when a thinker like Cicero 
linguistically refers to the human (or ‘man’) but instead has personification and 
relations of private property in mind: 
 
It is the function of a wise man, while doing nothing contrary to conventions, 
laws, and institutions, to be concerned about his private affairs. For we want to 
be wealthy not for ourselves, but also for our children, relatives, friends, and 
above all, for our country. For the resources and supplies of individuals are the 
wealth of the state.77 
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One historical consequence of taking the appearance of the person to be 
the essence of the human is attested by Henry Maine, writing that “it is exactly the 
Roman jurisprudence which, transformed by the theory of Natural Law, has 
bequeathed to the moderns the impression that individual ownership is the normal 
state of proprietary right, and that ownership in common by groups of men is only 
the exception to a general rule.”78  
The person of natural law is but the universalized commodification of all 
humans. For its own conceptual logic accords with “the natural laws of the 
commodity” that “have manifested themselves in the natural instinct of the owners 
of commodities.”79 ‘Natural laws’ here takes on a double meaning. It is a real and 
objective phenomenon with respect to the natural activity of commodity 
exchange. But it also appears as a natural given and transcendent condition of 
‘human’ life that has been present at all moments in human history such that all 
humans appear to have always been persons.  
The social activity of commodity exchange is antecedent to the thought 
that takes such an activity to be its own origin - which is true - but this origin 
appears in a distorted conceptual way as a natural law of ‘human relations’ as 
such, which is not true. The immediacy of the empirical point of view of this 
social activity conceals the social and historical origin of the commodity form. 
Instead, the natural logic of the commodity form morally and juridically re-
appears as a priori ‘natural laws’ between persons for the sake of the exchange of 
commodities. But these ‘natural laws’ of persons are in fact the historical 
expansion of market relations.  
 
2.2.2 Estrangement of the human community 
We have pointed out that the expansion of market society is commensurate with 
the expansion and strengthening of codified law, through which the status of the 
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legal person becomes increasingly ubiquitous. As this expansion is commensurate 
with the destruction and loss of direct human to human relationships, humans are 
increasingly transformed into atomized personifications of economic relations. 
The human community is subsequently estranged by the internal conflict of class 
inequalities and is hence lost as a true community.  
The person taken as human in the natural law theory of Stoicism is an 
attempt to reconcile the precepts of legal personhood of positive law with an 
inherent moral dignity found within all human beings. Natural law, therefore, 
attempts to re-invent the lost human community by universalizing the precepts of 
legal personhood across this estranged human community. The result, however, is 
not the return to a concrete and true human community, but an abstract and 
personified society of estranged humans who are taken to be equal insofar as they 
are all theoretically taken as persons.  
Personhood under natural law entails a universality that is only abstract. 
This remains abstract because the membership of this community is composed of 
atomized owners of private property that are bound together solely through 
relations of exchange. Hegel describes this as “the universal being thus split up 
into a mere multiplicity of individuals, the lifeless Spirit is an equality, in which 
all count as the same, i.e. as persons.”80 This formal universality of legal 
personhood is not a substantial social whole of the human community but a formal 
collection of alienated humans that “exist, as persons, on their own account, and 
exclude any continuity with others from the rigid unyieldingness of their 
atomicity.”81 What counts for being absolute and ‘essential’ in the sphere of 
personal independence is the isolated consciousness that asserts its ‘mine-ness’ of 
an abstract, immaterial self that eschews concrete human relationships. 
“Consciousness of right,” writes Hegel, “in the very fact of being recognized as 
having validity, experiences rather the loss of its reality and its complete 
inessentiality; and to describe an individual as a ‘person’ is an expression of 
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contempt.”82 This ‘loss of reality’ is the ideological point of view: the human 
estranged from his or her own species-being when he or she along with other 
members of this estranged community take themselves to be something other than 
human, that is, objectified owners of private property.  
This estranged human consciousness must be understood from the point of 
view of social forces of production. In the Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts, Marx writes that “the entire history of alienation… is therefore 
nothing more than the history of production of abstract, i.e. absolute, thought, of 
logical, speculative thought.”83 Stoic natural law is an expression of real suffering 
as well as it is the protest against this real suffering. The human is abstracted into 
a dignified person in an attempt to liberate human beings from their sufferable 
material conditions brought about by real forces of history. Only after the 
achievement of absolute property alongside the universalization of market 
relations would an estranged human community take the form of one large 
abstract social activity of market society, conceived in thought it were an integral 
whole, albeit abstracted from the world. 
The legal concept of the Roman person and the philosophical intervention 
of Stoicism offers us insight into the historical origins of how we conflate the 
person with the human today. This intellectual achievement of the Stoics has a 
twofold character: here begins a comprehensive principle of an inherent human 
dignity, albeit abstract; but this is at the expense of reifying the estranged human 
into an isolated personification of private property ownership, followed by a 
social fragmentation that appears to be anything but social. What this means for us 
today is that precisely when we confront one another as persons we are the most 
distant from our true human community.  
 
2.3 The Egoistic Person 
Section 2.1 demonstrated that in the ancient world commodity production and 
exchange reached a threshold such that social regulation took up a codified legal 
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character. De facto relations of private ownership therefore became de jure and 
acquired the codified category of the legal person. Section 2.2 demonstrated that 
the universalization of these market relations presented the appearance of private 
ownership to be a natural feature of the human essence. Section 2.3 follows from 
this conclusion of Stoic natural law and will demonstrate how the egoistic form of 
market relations is the basis upon which private ownership is ideologically taken 
to be the essence of the human.  
 Behind every juridical deliberation stands the premises of the egoistic 
form of personhood that logically precedes the legal form. As Pashukanis writes, 
“it is above all in private law that the a priori principles and premises of juridical 
thought become clothed in the flesh and blood of two litigating parties who, 
vindicta in hand, claim ‘their right’.”84 For analytical reasons, we must consider 
egoistic relations on their own, distinguished from the legal form. The legal form 
does guarantee and safeguard egoistic relations of market activity, but the legal 
form does not create these egoistic relations itself. For this reason, it was not 
necessary that Roman concept of absolute property logically preceded the egoistic 
relation to property, as is the case in common law. 
We will first consider the bond between egoistic persons and how this 
bond is determined with regard to producing and acquiring social needs within the 
division of labour. Second, we will demonstrate how this egoistic relation 
becomes the basis for a worldview of market society and taken to be the essence 
of the human, which in turn becomes the social and philosophical premise of legal 
personhood. In developing this notion of the egoistic person, we will also 
demonstrate how these egoistic relationships entail the estrangement of true 
human relationships.  
 
2.3.1 The manifestation of egoistic persons 
The egoistic person, Marx writes, “looks only to his own advantage. The only 
force bringing them together, and putting them into relation with each other, is the 
selfishness, the gain and the private interest of each. Each plays heed to himself 
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only, and no one worries about the others.”85 The egoistic person takes the world 
as it is only for him or herself and appropriates it as private property, that is to say, 
“he takes the world as his conception of the world, and the world as his 
conception of his imagined property. . .”86  
The nature of the egoistic person in only understood in relation to another 
egoistic person. This bond is constituted through the nature of the object 
constituted by the relation of private property. First, this object is a social need. 
But as private property, the satisfaction of this social need is alien to a person and 
therefore compels this person towards this object with necessity. For this reason, 
the sole activity of a person’s existence is the acquisition of the social needs from 
which he or she is separated. Labour’s capacity to create value, therefore, is a 
means towards these social needs as ends.87 It follows from this, then, that labour 
must be objectified and hence alienated such that it can be sold on the market in 
exchange for social needs. The egoistic relation is determined by the alienation of 
the producer’s labour.   
There are two aspects to these social needs within the division of labour in 
marketplace society. These social needs are alien to the person because they are 
the external, objectified private property of another. For this reason, a second 
aspect is entailed, which is the inner relation to the object: the feeling of a need for 
something is to take that thing to be a part of one’s own essence, “that its being is 
for me and that its property is the property, the particular quality peculiar to my 
essence.”88 Together, this external relation and inner relation compels the person 
to forsake his or her own private property in exchange, if at least the sale of his or 
her labour power, so that the social need may be acquired. A second person on the 
other end of this exchange in the same position with regard to acquiring social 
needs is necessary. Through transaction each person alienates a portion of their 
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private property for the essential benefit of the other. The transaction confirms the 
bond of both persons as egoistic owners of private property.  
The egoistic bond between persons in marketplace society confirms the 
estrangement of the human community for the reason that labour is no longer 
social and for others, but atomized for one’s self because it is the means by which 
social needs are acquired, needs which are no longer social and held in common 
but privately possessed.  
This estrangement is further intensified with the presence of the equivalent 
form of money, whereby the person no longer exchanges his or her own product 
directly with an object he or she needs, but for money alone as a mediator of 
exchange. Money here represents a total indifference to the particular qualities of 
social needs and hence the living human being. Money, therefore, represents 
human’s estrangement as such, as the “unfettered dominion of the estranged thing 
over man.”89 Moreover, “money is the sensuous, corporeal existence of that 
alienation,” writes Marx90. And “the more developed and important is the power 
of society within private property, the more man is egoistic, un-social and 
estranged from his own essence.”91  
The social bond is alienated through the alienation of labour, which is 
objectified as labour-power. Labour-power as value creation becomes the means 
by which the person may participate in the value relation by exchanging his or her 
own commodity for money. Predicated on the alienation of labour, the social bond 
between persons in the market is therefore an estranged human bond: 
 
For our products are not united for each other by the bond of human nature. 
Exchange can only set in motion, it can do no more than confirm the character 
each of us bears in relation to his or her own product and hence to the product 
of the other. Each of us sees in his product only his own objectified self-interest, 
hence in the product of others the objectification of a different, alien self-
interest, independent of oneself.92  
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The essence of human relationships is estranged because humans do have 
the inner relation to each other’s products that is socially necessary but these 
products are externally separated by the division of labour and are objectified by 
private property relations. A true human relation to social needs, on its own, 
admits no power or rights of possession over these needs.  
We must consider, then, how the bond between egoistic persons appears to 
be a bond of mutuality when in fact, for human relations, it is nothing of the sort: 
 
Thus the social relation I bear to you, the labour I perform to satisfy your need, 
is likewise merely an appearance and our mutual supplementing of each other 
is equally but an appearance, based on our mutual plundering of each other. 
The intention to plunder, to deceive, inevitably lurks in the background, for, 
since our exchange is self-interested on your side as well as on mine, and since 
every self-interested person seeks to outdo the other, we must necessarily strive 
to deceive each other.93  
 
The bond appears as a mutually beneficial agreement because the mutual respect 
for personhood must be acknowledged by both parties through a moral 
equivalence as a moment of fairness and equality. But this mutual recognition of 
mutual power through the exchange relation is only the struggle towards victory 
and greater power on the market. Egoistic persons recognize one another’s needs 
only insofar as this exchange renders their own needs attainable. Thus, equality 
through exchange is necessary but it is only a means towards self-interested ends. 
The recognition of another person on the market is only an instrumental ‘as if’. 
The mutual recognition of equality on the market is instrumentally 
necessary egoistic relations, without which another individual is no longer a 
person but “merely a human being and your demand is no more than an 
ungratified desire on your part, a non-existent idea as far as I am concerned.”94 As 
human beings, we therefore have no direct relations to one another in the abstract 
because we have no common direct relation to human property. It is only as 
personifications that we capable of attaining these social needs as private 
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property. As estranged humans, we exclude ourselves from true human property 
because our private property as persons excludes humans.  
 
2.3.2 The egoistic worldview and the legal form 
Through the egoistic relation, “a person’s particular activity and situation in life 
[sinks] to the level of a purely individual significance,” writes Marx, and “they no 
longer constituted the relationship of the individual to the state as a whole.”95 
Civil society is thus constituted by the self-concerned individual that “inevitably 
appears as unpolitical man, as natural man. The rights of man appear as natural 
rights, for self-consciousness activity is concentrated upon the political act. 
Egoistic man is the passive and merely given result of the society which has been 
dissolved, an object of immediate certainty, and for that reason a natural object.”96 
The atomized form of the modern legal person logically follows from this premise 
of naturalized egoism, reflecting this abstraction from the social and historical 
circumstances of the human community.  
Because the egoistic person takes the world only as it is for him or herself, 
the historical and social determinations of the human being are eschewed from 
consciousness. The egoistic contradictions of market forces, though real social 
activity, are not taken as historically determined, but natural, and hence the social 
struggles between human beings take the appearance of atomized struggles 
between owners of private property. The egoistic person, therefore, can be 
described as the personalization of economic struggle. 
A cornerstone moment in the philosophical contemplation of the egoistic 
person is found in the writings of Locke, reflecting the real processes of 
depoliticization and atomization of persons in the early modern period. The 
category of the person from the empiricist views of Locke posits the ontological 
priority of the individual self as an owner of private property. This private 
property begins as one’s own body and labour and must be preserved as such. In 
order to preserve one’s private property, the individual must appropriate natural 
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resources by conquering the commons. Through the sensuous activity of labour an 
individual mixes their private property with the commons so as to turn this new 
product of their labour into private property: for “every Man has a Property in his 
own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, 
and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his,”97 upon which the 
person “by his Labour does, as it were, inclose it from the Common”98. This 
egoistic abstraction arises by negating the commons into private property. It is by 
this appropriative act that this social human transforms into the anti-social 
character – through negation of the commons, depoliticized person come into 
competition with each other. 
Personal struggle through the preservation of private property by 
accumulation becomes a rallying point in a person’s existence in capitalist society. 
As C.B. Macpherson comments with respect to Locke, “if it is labour, a man’s 
absolute property, which justifies appropriation and creates value, the individual 
right of appropriation overrides any moral claim of society.”99 The net result of an 
estranged human society that takes itself to be so many egoistic persons is defined 
by Friedrich Engels, writing that “each is in the way of the other, and each seeks 
to crowd out all who are in his way, and to put himself in their place, the workers 
are in constant competition among themselves as are the members of the 
bourgeoisie among themselves.”100 Social struggle personified then becomes so 
many individualized struggles appearing as rugged, egoistic competition between 
individuals. 
 The empiricist point of view of the egoistic person reflects an inability to 
ask why some people ‘inherently’ want to accumulate wealth and why some 
people are exploited. This rendering invisible of the historical conditions that 
produce egoistic relations is a product of market abstraction itself and the 
increasingly abstract character of private property.  
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Even though English property law is not rooted in the tradition of absolute 
property of Roman civil law, we can detect a semblance of such a concept of 
property already appearing for Bentham. For the shift towards capitalist forms of 
private property instigated novel notions of private property that necessarily 
reflected novel market forces. Bhandar points out that Bentham was already 
attempting to describe private property in an absolute sense based on a ‘feeling of 
expectation’ that property could belong to an owner without being directly before 
one’s eyes. But because of the empiricist atmosphere in which Bentham was 
writing, he could not describe this beyond a kind of ‘affective’ relation.101 This 
expresses an intimate quality of the egoistic relation to private property in a way 
that conceals the historicity of the relation behind a ‘feeling’. 
From this perspective, the complexity of history and social relations are 
not immediate before one’s eyes and are thus not the object of one’s personal 
introspection. The inability to seriously ask this question is from the point of view 
that benefits from not doing so, and rests at falsely assuming that what we see 
before us as a historical fact of habit is an established fact of an immutable human 
nature. The historical appearance of competition becomes universally pervasive as 
a primary social relation in market society such that egoism would appear to be 
the essence of the human spirit rather than collectivity and solidarity. This false 
assumption of the egoistic person, now, serves as a logical basis for the legal 
person within the realm of ‘subjective law’ with notable ideological force in the 
adversarial system of common law.  
The aspect of ‘subjective law’ that belongs to the legal form of 
personhood, “is born in a society of isolated bearers of private egoistic 
interests,”102 writes Pashukanis.  This aspect of subjective right that informs the 
legal person stands in contrast to ‘objective law’, which is the legal expression of 
market society as a whole. The division between subjective law and objective law 
is a reflection of the division between a civil society of depoliticized self-
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interested persons and the abstract universal interest of the political whole 
represented by the state.  
Because the egoistic person is a naturalized, pre-legal and unconditional 
given, the idea of personal responsibility and private interests that complement the 
legal form of subjective law follow from this. The atomized psychological 
character of the egoistic person matches the psychologism of legal capacity. 
Whereas legal capacity is a formal concept that measures the ability to carry out 
legal actions and contract relations, the psychological ego informs the subjective 
nature of personal responsibility and private interests with respect to these actions. 
This depoliticized psychological notion of the ego aligns with the abstraction of 
the legal person that obfuscates historical and social determination of the human 
being.   
Because subjective law affirms only the private interests of the egoistic 
person, personal responsibility, in the case of criminal law, for example, is only 
considered as an isolated abstraction detached from social and historical 
significance. Social and historical determinations of real class relations are not 
considered to be the real basis for which certain crimes may be committed. The 
alliance between the psychological school of jurisprudence and the psychological 
school of political economy bring together the legal person and the egoistic person 
under one rubric of a subjective realm of an atomized consciousness where 
personal compulsions are taken to begin with the autonomous individual alone.  
If the courts were truly concerned with the living conditions of the accused 
or the social basis for certain crimes with the view of improving society, the 
abstract character of personal responsibility and hence the meaning of an 
equivalent ‘punishment’ would be lost in criminal proceeding. The law, therefore, 
administers class struggle by reducing subjects to depoliticized, private, and 
anonymous competitive persons in two aspects: 
  
The materialization of this exchange relation in criminal law is one aspect of the 
constitutional state as the embodiment of the ideal legal form of transaction 
between independent and equal producers meeting in the market. However, 
since social relations are not confined to the abstract relations between abstract 
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commodity owners, so too the criminal court is not only an embodiment of 
abstract legal form, but also a weapon in the immediate class struggle.103  
 
The egoistic person informs the basic character of legal relations. The 
state, however, also administers class relations by imposing such egoistic market 
relations onto subjects in an objective way. “Modern criminal law,” writes 
Pashukanis, “starts out, not at all from the damage suffered by the injured party, 
but from the violation of the norm established by the state.”104 The law’s 
imposition of the market relation as a norm is also the systematic estrangement of 
human relations by transforming or ‘rehabilitating’ these estranged humans as 
personifications. The law asserts itself here where the morality of market relations 
is lacking in the individual.   
 
2.4 The Moral Person 
The following section discusses the moral relation of the person with respect to 
the egoistic relation and the legal relation. What we find here is the highest 
expression of bourgeois ethics founded on the apriorism of private property. 
Morality in the market comes to express the social existence of persons as a 
whole, albeit an abstract whole removed from concrete historical conditions. The 
core argument here is that bourgeois morality conceals the compulsions of our 
personifications of commodities, having the individual believe that their 
obligations towards the institution of private property are entirely free, 
contractual, and of a human nature.  
 
2.4.1 The moral whole 
The moral relation of personhood is defined in terms of its attempt to resolve real 
social contradictions at the core of market society. On the one hand, owners of 
commodities are egoistic bearers of untethered freedom in the marketplace, 
compelled towards their social needs in competition against others. On the other 
hand, the law must be socially binding such that the egoistic person must respect 
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the autonomy of other persons. Morality, therefore, is a dimension of market 
relations that functions to raise the person above the idiosyncratic proclivities of 
particular self-interests to the abstract universal whole of market society.  
  The moral relation is the negation of both the particularism of the egoistic 
person and negation of the coercive externality of the law. The moral moment of 
the person reconciles this contradiction through the moral law within, reflecting 
the socially binding value relation. The social activity that expresses this free and 
willing relation to the whole is found in the activity that binds market person 
together: exchange. In this respect, morality in market society, writes Pashukanis, 
“comes down to the fact that man does ‘freely’, that is out of inner conviction, that 
which he would be compelled to do in the sphere of law”.105 Without this, the 
egoistic person and the law would be irreconcilably antagonistic.  
The moral law reconciles these contradictions through a supra-sensible 
moral individuality. Moral constitution of the person is de-personalized, bereft of 
fear, tastes, sympathy, or feelings of social solidarity.106 It stands above human 
motives as a kind of artificial intelligence out of science fiction. The assumption is 
that when real emotional or social intuition is involved, the consciousness of the 
intelligent moral machine cannot operate. If I relate to the world for what it is - 
social, concrete, and particular - then I am already in the realm of bias and 
therefore not fit to participate in moral decision making. This ‘bias’ is the 
particular point of view of the human with respect to his or her concrete social 
needs, and so must thereby be excluded from the moral constitution of 
personhood. The moral relation of personhood, therefore, must exclude the human 
by definition. 
The moral relation that excludes the concrete character of the human is a 
real social force in the market. This is shown by the principle that moral persons 
must treat one another as ends rather than means. But because the moral concept 
of the person excludes anything truly human, it is not the case that the human is 
treated as an end. Pashukanis points out that the maxim “treat your fellow man as 
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an end in himself” remains meaningful in situations when humans are, in fact, 
treated as mere means. This is because means are bound up with the concrete 
social world – the human world – from which the moral law has been abstracted. 
“Moral fervour is inextricably bound up with and feeds on the morality of social 
practice. Ethical doctrines claim to change and improve the world whereas, in 
reality, they are merely a distorted reflection of one aspect of this real world – the 
aspect which shows social relations to be subject to the law of value.”107 The real 
end here is the absolute integrity of the private property relation itself. If some 
human beings are estranged as a consequence, then this estrangement is the means 
that justifies the pursuit of the moral ends of property-owning persons.  
In the case of egoistic persons that recognize one another as equals in the 
exchange relation, we demonstrated that this recognition is merely a means for 
egoistic self-interest to acquire social needs. Moral personhood presents this social 
recognition as a principled relation of fairness and equality, which stipulates that 
owners of private property must be treated as ends. From the point of view of the 
moral whole, the true end is mutual recognition in the exchange relation itself. But 
from the point of view of the atomized egoistic person, it is a means. For this 
reason, moral equivalence conceals the fact that egoistic persons may treat one 
another as means towards market power. Large capitalists, for instance, can 
destroy small capitalists in good faith because they have all ‘agreed to the rules’. 
The working class is also morally ‘equal’ in principle to the capitalist. But the 
working class, estranged from their labour, remains instrumental in the production 
of value for the capitalist. A basic minimum condition for sufficient commodity 
exchange, Pashukanis writes, is that commodity owners must act as if they 
acknowledge one another as equals.108  
 
2.4.2 Morality and Market Freedom 
We have demonstrated that the moral relation is a social function in the market 
that resolves a contradiction between the law of the state and the egoistic atoms of 
 
107 Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law & Marxism. 157 
108 ibid. 162 
 
 58 
civil society. From the juridical perspective, it makes no difference if a debt is 
repaid because one will be forced to repay it anyway. And the depoliticized, 
atomized egoistic person, in and of itself, owes nothing to the state. The moral 
law, thus, comes from ‘within’ and compels the debtor to pay ‘freely’.  
The person’s moral commitment to the exchange relation fits the form of 
the fulfillment of a legal claim. For Pashukanis, if we take this idea to its most 
consistent conclusion, the result is that legal obligation is not the same thing as a 
duty. The law does not commit the legal person to anything. Legal ‘obligation’ 
exists only as a liability. The free will of the moral law must step in because “if 
legal obligation has nothing in common with ‘inner’ moral duty, then there is no 
way of differentiating between subjection to law and subjection to authority as 
such.”109  
The categorical imperative reconciles the egoism and the law by imploring 
us to “act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law”.110 Stated in another way as egoistic persons, our 
allegiance to private property is our personal freedom, which is only possible, 
however, if we as moral persons follow that law of private property which we 
would also will such that it becomes universally binding law.  
 
2.4.3 Morality as a binding force for the market 
How is the moral bond a reflection of market relation? Here we provide an answer 
to how contract relations are socially binding. In section 2.3 we discussed the 
egoistic social form of the person with respect to the alienation of social needs in 
the division of labour. But because these social needs vary depending on the 
disposition of the particular person, our egoistic, self-interested relations alone do 
not suffice to bind persons together. What remains, then, is to understand the way 
in which the supersensible moral relation devoid of human disposition is also a 
reflection of value relation in which ‘not a single atom of matter enters’.  
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In Chapter One we discussed how the value relation is a ‘pure’ social 
relation of commodity production and exchange, also termed ‘real abstraction’. 
We mentioned that we must consider abstraction to be something whose source is 
in real social activity, and that the mind which produces thought-abstractions 
(concepts) is but a reflection of this kind of activity. The value relation constitutes 
a universal binding relation within a commodity producing society. Labour 
produces value for the purpose of exchange, an exchange that is possible only 
through the abstract labour measured by the magnitude of socially necessary 
labour time.  
 
The increasing division of labour, improvements in communications, and 
resulting development of exchange, made value an economic category, that is to 
say, the embodiment of supra-individual social relations of production… At this 
stage of development, value ceases to be casual appraisal, loses the quality of a 
phenomenon of the individual psyche, and acquires objective economic 
significance.111  
 
Because we appear as so many self-interested egos, it is natural to wonder 
how it is that the content of law is morally binding at all. The answer is in two 
steps. First, we are separate from our social needs through private possession and 
so our personal activity aims towards these social needs through the act of 
exchange. We must therefore confront this other by offering up our own property 
as exchange. We have therefore produced a value in order to exchange for another. 
Second, the equivalence of value is expressed through the social act of exchange 
which renders two owners of private property mutually recognizable.  The 
moment where exchange value appears as the negation of the use value is the 
moment where the value relation is reflected in a moral equivalence and, by 
extension, the social whole. 
If the supra-sensible value relation is reflected in the supra-sensible moral 
relation, the real material and historical conditions of the moral relation as a force 
of market society is concealed to consciousness.  The historical context of market 
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society is concealed as the determination in what is right and wrong. Moral 
apriorism is this vanishing point.   
 In the moral constitution of personhood, the a priori postulate is the point 
at which the historical character of market society as a social whole is abstracted 
from and is negated such that the appearance of an abstract, homogeneous/s moral 
relation is taken to be an ahistorical given. This is how market relations appear to 
originate from the ‘free’ from the vacuum of an autonomous will.  
When we take the moral relation between persons to represent the social 
whole of market society, the ‘givenness’ of apriorism disallows us from the ability 
to comprehend the historical and the social binding force of the value relation. 
One conclusion to this ideological thinking in the market is the belief that 
economic inequalities are solely the result of poor choices of isolated individuals 
themselves, rather than a necessary feature of the social division of labour. It is 
difficult for moral consciousness of market persons to contemplate their own 
social existence as a historical relation since they take this relational form to be 
the objective nature of human relationships in general. It follows from this that 
arguments deriving class inequalities and the general debasement of human beings 
from capitalist relations of production are difficult for people to accept, let alone 
comprehend, as the force of these relations are postulated a priori givens, taken as 
if they were human. This is why thinking alternative forms of social relations not 
based on private property relations usually fall on deaf ears or worse – they are 
considered a moral threat to social whole. 
 
2.4.4 Conclusion of Chapter Two: a contradictory unity 
The person is not reducible to either one of these moments discussed in this 
Chapter. When attempting to develop a legitimized notion of the person in market 
society, the postulates of egoism, morality, and legality are all necessary and 
compensate for what each other lack on their own, forming dialectical unity. But 
in the attempt to develop such a notion of the person, if these postulates ever come 
into contradiction with one another, it is because they are reflections of different 




As always, the contradiction in the system here too reflects the contradictions in 
real life, that is in the social environment which produced the form of morality 
and law as they exist… The contradiction is embodied in the actual interrelation 
of people who cannot regard their private endeavours as social aspirations 
except in the absurd and justified form of the value of commodities.112 
 
No definition of personhood, therefore, is tenable without taking into 
account that it is an idea that is internally contradictory because it reflects 
different aspects of contradictory market relations. It is these internal 
contradictions within the social existence of personhood that are externally 
expressed as the contradiction between the person and the human, the effect of 



























Each of the four aspects of personhood presented in chapter two were analyzed in 
two primary ways. First, we demonstrated that the legal, egoistic, and moral 
relations between persons represented various moments of market relations. We 
also showed that taking the person to be human further naturalizes these market 
relations. We argued that neither one of these aspects of personhood is reducible 
to the other, but that they, together, form a contradictory unity reflecting the 
contradictory character of social relations in market society. Second, such a 
demonstration relied on distinguishing the person from the human and pointing 
out that relations between persons, as the social activity of personified economic 
relations, bring about the estrangement of human beings. The following chapter 
brings the analysis of this estrangement to a close.  
 
3.1 The person as the appearance of the alienated human  
The human being transformed into a personification is estranged from his or her 
own species-being. This estrangement begins with the product of his or her own 
labour. When labour is objectified as a commodity, it becomes a product that 
stands in alien opposition to the producer, objectified as a value for exchange: “the 
realization of labour is its objectification. In the sphere of political economy this 
realization of labour appears as a loss of reality for the worker, objectification as 
loss of and bondage to the object, and appropriation as estrangement, as 
alienation.”113  
If the realization of labour as a commodity entails an individual’s 
personification, the legal status of the person that is conferred on this individual 
reifies this loss of reality for the producer. The producer does not confirm him or 
herself while he or she works but only confirms his or her labour power as the 
private property of another owner for a socially necessary period of time. “Hence 
the worker feels himself only when he is not working; when he is working he does 
not feel himself. He is at home when he is not working, and not at home when he 
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is working. His labour is therefore not voluntary but forced, it is forced labour. It 
is therefore not the satisfaction of a need but a mere means to satisfy needs outside 
itself.”114  
The individual’s life at any given moment is subordinate to his or her 
commodity that must be preserved in an atomized, self-interested way. “It turns 
his species-life into a means for his individual life,” writes Marx, “firstly it 
estranges species-life and individual life, and secondly it turns the latter, in its 
abstract form, into the purpose of the former, also in its abstract and estranged 
form.”115 This is the moment where “life itself appears only as a means of life.”116 
As a person who sells his or her commodity, life and the means to sustain 
this life take the alien form of private property and has thus become the estranged 
human’s own ‘tense essence’ to which he or she is bound. This relation to 
production admits a social existence of personhood contrary to the social 
existence of the human being: “Just as private property is only the sensuous 
expression of the fact that man becomes objective for himself and at the same time 
becomes an alien and human object for himself.” 117 The human’s expression of 
his or her own life as a person is this alienation of life and a realization of the loss 
of human reality. 
The dual social existence of the person and the estranged human can be 
considered in the following way: “just as he is depressed, therefore, both 
intellectually and physically to the level of machine, and from being a man 
becomes an abstract activity and a stomach”. This abstract activity and stomach 
constitute the dual ontology of market society. On one hand we have the estranged 
human stomach and on the other hand we have the abstract activity of personified 
economic relations: 
 
the fundamental character of capitalism… revealed in the tendency to make 
abstract categories live as though they were concrete. Categories become 
subjects, or rather, even persons, though we must speak here of person in the 
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Latin sense, that is, of masks… ‘Capitalist’ means a man transformed into a 
mask, into the person of capital: in him acts capital producing capital… The 
abstract, in capitalist society, functions concretely.118 
 
 The contradictory unity of this dual ontology is precisely in that this 
abstract activity estranges the human being from his or her species being but 
cannot go any further than reducing the human being to a stomach, without which 
production and exchange, at the end of the day, would not be possible. 
The secret to understanding the existence of persons requires we 
acknowledge that the concept of the person denotes only the personifications of 
market relations and not the human being. And insofar as humans can transform 
into persons, this transformation is predicated on the estrangement of their 
humanity.  
 Here we can identify a broad view of an estranged human community: 
within market society, the human community is divided between persons and non-
persons, whereby the latter experience dehumanization as a result. An estranged 
human community is not a true whole, but an estranged whole divided within 
itself, whereby humans are incapable of recognizing other humans as human – but 
only as persons or non-persons. This tells us something important about the 
relationship between personhood and dehumanization. 
 From initial appearances, it seems as though the dehumanization that 
follows from the exclusion from personhood means that to be a person is to be 
‘human-ized’. This would be incorrect, however, as this is the ideological point of 
view that takes the existence of the person to be the essence of the human. As we 
have pointed out, what the person takes itself to be as ‘human’ is not genuinely 
human, but only the personification of market relations. Because the estranged 
human misidentifies his or her essence to be his or her existence as a person, what 
it means to be genuinely human is eschewed from the individual’s consciousness 
and from the consciousness of market society as a whole. From this perspective, if 
market society reduces some humans to persons, then it also reduces non-persons 
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to non-humans. If, as persons, we do not recognize one another as human, neither 
do we recognize non-persons as human.  
  
3.2 Questions for future research 
This research pertains closely to matters beyond the scope that has been presented 
here. We set out to understand the conditions through which relations between 
persons are constituted and their various ideological moments embedded in these 
relations. We sought to understand how the exclusion of some humans from 
personhood is predicated on a dual and contradictory social reality between 
persons and humans. It is therefore not as simple as arguing that the exclusion 
from personhood is dehumanizing because personhood itself is already the 
alienated existence of the human being not only by definition by in its social 
existence.  
 Follow up research could approach the problem of humans excluded from 
personhood from this revelation, although the social existence of the non-person 
does not have the same homogeneous social existence as the person. At various 
moments in the history of market societies, the exclusion of various groups of 
humans from personhood occurs on different bases and therefore must be treated 
on a case by case basis. The consistent element across these analyses, however, 
would be the non-person’s place within the division of labour and the value 
relation in order to identify the particular nature of their social existence as a non-
person. It is worth looking at a couple examples of what we mean.  
 In the literature review we discussed the exclusion of children and 
intellectual disabled people. In light of what we have discussed, these types of 
exclusions are ‘justified’ through the abstraction of legal capacity imposed on 
humans as a criterion that reflects the capacity to produce value and hence sell 
labour-power on the market. What this means in these two cases is that 
personhood is contingent upon the capacity to be exploited in the marketplace. 
Though this abstraction of legal capacity has historically been used to ‘officially’ 
deny the personhood for women and racialized minorities, it is not because labour 
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was not exploitable. The exclusion from personhood for these two ‘groups’ thus 
entails a different social determination within the value relation.  
 We have pointed out that the value relation is the social activity of 
marketplace society and is the force that socially binds persons together. The 
juridical category of the person reflects the participants of this value relation by 
abstracting individuals from their concrete differentiations and rendering them 
‘equals’. It is not the case, however, that only juridical persons participate in the 
value relation while non-persons are outside of this relation. This entails a 
different kind of social existence for non-persons who still participate in the value 
relation. 
 We will offer here brief analysis of how the current research relates to 
racialization through the value relation from the point of view of slavery. We can 
build upon a critique offered by Bhandar and Toscano who, following Ruth 
Wilson Gilmore, argue that the articulation of categories of racial differences are 
‘modalities’ of “the high level logic of abstraction intrinsic to value as a social 
form of capitalism.”119 Their term ‘modality’ refers to the social existence (as 
opposed to essence) that is produced through the value relation. The person is a 
modality of the value relation in the way we have explained it.  
  The relation between being and having marks the basic relationship 
between the ontology of persons in relation to their property. The private property 
relation in market society produces the social modality of the person as a private 
owner. But what happens to the social modality when the dialectic of persons and 
property collapses in on itself? Bhandar argues that the distinction between these 
two moments collapses in the advent of slavery with the synthetic result of 
racialization. The social being of a slave at one and the same time an objectified 
piece of private property as well as a legal subject capable of criminal liability. 
According to Bhandar, this calls our attention to the manner in which the legal 
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dialectic of personhood and property produced a novel social ontology of ‘race’ as 
a socially objective hybrid of human and object.120  
 We can identify here the point at which the person-property relation 
stratifies the human being into various levels of ‘human-ness’. Gilmore argues 
that “racism is a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of 
difference into hierarchies that organize relations within and between the planet’s 
sovereign political territories.”121 With respect to the person/non-person 
distinction, we can see how the value relation that abstracts persons from concrete 
differentiation, in fact, does the invers in the case of non-persons. The fetishism of 
the commodity form does not neutralize but reifies these differentiations through 
abstraction and places them into relation with one another through a hierarchy. 
This fetishization of concrete but contingent differentiations is distributed 
amongst group of humans into abstract racialized categories like ‘black’ and 
‘white’ and naturalizes these categories into a social hierarchy of being in market 
society. Through this value relation and property law, a category like ‘whiteness’ 
comes to represent the person of full rights. The process of abstraction that 
signifies racism, writes Gilmore, “produces effects at the most intimately 
“sovereign” scale, insofar as particular kinds of bodies, one by one, are materially 
(if not always visibly) configured by racism into a hierarchy of human and 
inhuman persons that in sum form the category “human being”,122 where ‘race’ is 
taken to be essence. The ‘propertizing’ of human life in the history of colonial 
regimes forms the historical basis for the metaphysics of identity with respect to 
‘whiteness’ or ‘blackness’ that continue on long after abolition as the basis for 
further exploitation in wage labour. 
 This kind of approach to understanding the racialization rooted in the 
value relation and juridical regimes reflects what has been presented in this thesis. 
The person is not a mere abstraction of the mind or a legal status, but a social 
existence (or modality) in its own right that stands in contradiction with the 
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human being. Can it be articulated, then, that the social contradictions between 
racialized modalities within market society are various reifications of this general 
contradiction between market society and the estranged human community? 
 The implications of this question reach as far as our methodological 
approach towards social reality. As Bhandar remarks, there is a sizable body of 
literature that undertakes the deconstruction of Eurocentrism and cultural bias in 
the content of the law. But she argues such literature often stops at descriptive and 
discursive critiques of prevailing ideas and ideology. Research must also analyze 
“how racial subjects are produced by these modes of legal recognition” and must 
“consider the constitutive relationship between property law and racial 
subjectivity.”123 It has been the task of this thesis to demonstrate how this kind of 
approach may be possible; to demonstrate how what we take the person to be is a 
material artifact of the production process itself and is not a mere idea in the 
minds of humans, but an actual social existence that stands in contradiction to the 





















This subject matter of this argument begins and ends with human relations. To put 
this simply, as Marx says, the human “is governed by the products of his own 
hand.”124 The market society in question that brings about the estrangement of 
human relations is not an impersonal, detached system that looms in the 
background shaping us as persons and estranged humans. Estrangement of the 
human community begins with the immediate social activity of humans acting in a 
way that is contrary to their essence.  
Alongside the analysis of estranged human relations in market society, this 
research also presents a methodology for understanding the nature and origins of 
this this estrangement and a way to identify false assumptions and ideological 
premises in those works that take themselves to be speaking about the ‘human’. 
This begins with distinguishing existence itself from essence, and recognizing the 
historicity of humans’ existence as distinct from what humans essentially are as 
species-being.  
If the argument presented here has merit, what is to be said about the 
subject matter of the social sciences and the humanities? If it is true that, in 
market society, we embody a dual social existence as persons (or non-persons) 
and as (estranged) humans, is this duality not at the centre of the most important 
issues concerning the social sciences and humanities? If this is the case, then 
scholarship that takes its subject matter to be the ‘human’ without noting this 
distinction is ideologically inhibited by its own presumptions. It follows that the 
subject matter of the social sciences and the humanities is something other than 
the human, but rather the prosaic existence of persons.  
What is the consequence of scholarship taking the existence of person to 
be the essence of the human? In an effort to tackle the variety of ways the human 
being finds him or herself estranged in daily life, the point of view that cannot 
demonstrate the contradictory duality of social life in market society risks 
ideologically re-affirming the category of the person. For we have demonstrated 
 




that notions of legal right, egoistic personhood, and morality are deeply suspect as 
they are ideological reflections of market society. If this is true, it would be 
mistaken to think we could continue to speak of the meaning of rights, personal 
autonomy, or morality without taking into account the rational and social 
substrate of private property relations that underscore the estrangement of the 
human community in market society.  
The estrangement of the genuine human community through market 
society has come a long way to conflate the categories of the person and the 
human. A notable example of this appears in Human Rights discourse: given what 
has been argued in this thesis, what are we to make of the preamble to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights that postulates “the dignity and worth of 
the human person”? or in Article 3 that states “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty, and security of person”? And yet it is clear in Article 17 that what is 
presumed in the so-called ‘human person’ is an owner of private property, and 
that this document does not envision forms of property relations outside of this 
status quo. We can observe here the abstraction of the human being from his or 
her historical context, which in turn obscures the premises of a market-based 
social formations concealed in such a document.  
A necessary aspect of the ideological conflation of the person and the 
human is the inability to re-imagine social relations and our abilities to relate to 
our social needs and labours in a way that does not entail private ownership or 
private rights as individuals. So long as we take our existence as persons to be our 
essence as humans, our self-recognition as humans remains alienated. The 
enigmatic and self-contradictory character of personhood is reflected in the fact 
that what it means to be a human is also enigmatic due to our estrangement. Our 
inability to articulate the terms of our estrangement in market society is precisely 
an expression of this enigma.  
How, then, are we to study the human being and the human community, 
let alone confront one another as such in a daily manner? This involves a clarity in 
the subject matter of research and the need to distinguish the historical existence 
of estranged relations amongst humans from the transhistorical essence of the 
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genuine human community. This involves scrutinizing ubiquitous human 
behaviour as historical behaviour and situating these social relations within the 
context of the market and relations of private property. Here it is possible to 
derive an understanding of the basic forces of alienation from given historical 
circumstances. Taking the genuine human being and community as the subject 
matter of research is to properly locate the source of estrangement expressed 
through the movement of social relations determined by a given mode of 
production. Moreover, it is necessary that our taken-for-granted perspectives in 
morality, egoistic autonomy, and legal relations do not necessarily stipulate the 
human being as its subject matter no matter how definitive the use of the word 
‘human’ may be.  
Such an analyses always confront what is hidden in plain sight. The person 
– the product of humans’ own hands – is a social existence carried before our 
eyes, but whose social existence is hidden, as it were, behind the veneer that takes 
such a social existence to be essence. In this way, the historical character of the 
person, and hence the estrangement of the human, is concealed before our very 
eyes. Unveiling this to reveal a dual social existence that is contradictory must 
become the task of the social sciences and humanities. Without this this 
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